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Abstract
In the case of Puerto Rico, the exercise of self-determination has raised, and continues to raise,
particularly difficult questions that have not been adequately addressed. Indeed, as legal scholars
Gary Lawson and Robert Sloane observe in a recent article, “[t]he profound issues raised by the
domestic and international legal status of Puerto Rico need to be faced and resolved.” Accord-
ingly, this Note focuses on the application of the principle of self-determination to the people of
Puerto Rico. Part I provides an overview of the development of the principle of self-determination
in international law and Puerto Rico’s commonwealth status. Part II provides background infor-
mation on the political status debate in Puerto Rico and focuses on three key issues that arise in the
context of self-determination in Puerto Rico. Part III explains why Puerto Rico’s political status
needs to be resolved and how the process of self-determination should proceed in Puerto Rico.
Ultimately, this Note contends that the people of Puerto Rico have yet to fully exercise their right
to self-determination.
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AN UNSATISFACTORY CASE OF SELF-
DETERMINATION: RESOLVING PUERTO RICO’S 
POLITICAL STATUS 
Lani E. Medina 
“[O]nce the principle of equal citizenship and the plight of our 
colonial peoples have been fully understood, there becomes no way to deny 
admission to the citizens of Puerto Rico when and if they exercise their 
right to self-determination by choosing to demand that status.” 
—Luis R. Dávila-Colón 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Puerto Rico’s status as a U.S. territory since 18982 has been a 
subject of widespread debate for many years. Some have focused 
on the constitutionality of the current relationship between the 
United States and Puerto Rico3 and whether Puerto Rico still 
qualifies as a U.S. colony.4 Others have focused on Public Law 
600, the U.S. statute that led to Puerto Rico’s establishment as a 
 
  J.D. Candidate, 2010, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2005, Columbia 
University. The author would like to thank Professor Gráinne de Búrca for her guidance 
during the drafting process of this Note; Professor Robin A. Lenhardt for encouraging 
her to write this Note in the first place; and her friends and family for their love and 
support.  
1. Luis R. Dávila-Colón, Equal Citizenship, Self-Determination, and the U.S. Statehood 
Process: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 315, 374 
(1981). 
2. See infra note 83 and accompanying text (referring to the Treaty of Peace 
between the United States and Spain). 
3. See, e.g., Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Land that Democratic Theory Forgot, 83 IND. L.J. 
1525, 1556 (2008) (“[T]he status of Puerto Rico under U.S. law raises innumerable 
questions of democratic theory and constitutional law.”); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Puerto 
Rico and the Constitution: Conundrums and Prospects, 11 CONST. COMMENT 15, 15 (1995) 
(“The constitutional status of Puerto Rico raises complex and interesting puzzles.”). 
4. Compare Jason Adolfo Otaño, Note, Puerto Rico Pandemonium: The Commonwealth 
Constitution and the Compact-Colony Conundrum, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1806, 1811 (2004) 
(contending that Puerto Rico is still a U.S. colony), with Natsu Taylor Saito, Asserting 
Plenary Power Over the “Other”: Indians, Immigrants, Colonial Subjects, and Why U.S. 
Jurisprudence Needs to Incorporate International Law, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 427, 472 
(2002) (describing the U.S. position that Puerto Rico is a commonwealth, not a U.S. 
colony). 
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commonwealth in 1952,5 and whether the United Nations 
(“U.N.”) should have subsequently removed Puerto Rico from 
the list of non-self-governing territories in 1953.6 
The Honorable Gustavo A. Gelpí, U.S. District Court Judge 
for District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, recently 
concluded that Puerto Rico is an incorporated territory of the 
United States even without any affirmative language from the 
U.S. Congress to that effect.7 The court stated, “[a]ctions speak 
louder than words. Although Congress has never enacted any 
affirmative language such as ‘Puerto Rico is hereby an 
incorporated territory,’ its sequence of legislative actions from 
1900 to present has in fact incorporated the territory.”8 
While Puerto Rico has been “increasingly integrated” into 
the United States over the years, as legal historian Christina Duffy 
Burnett explains, Puerto Rico “still has not been ‘incorporated’ 
into the United States in a constitutional sense.”9 In other words, 
the island remains an unincorporated U.S. territory over which 
the U.S. Congress has plenary power.10 Puerto Rico’s status as an 
unincorporated U.S. territory derives from the territorial 
incorporation doctrine,11 a judicially-created doctrine based on 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis of the Territorial Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution in a group of cases decided in the early 
twentieth century, known as the Insular Cases.12 Based on the 
island’s territorial status, the people of Puerto Rico do not 
 
5. See infra notes 89–92 (discussing Public Law 600 and Puerto Rico’s establishment 
as a commonwealth). 
6. See infra note 108 (noting that the United Nations continues to monitor Puerto 
Rico’s status). 
7. See Consejo de Salud Playa Ponce v. Rullan, 586 F. Supp. 2d 22, 41 (D. P.R. 2008) 
(concluding that Puerto Rico is an incorporated U.S. territory based on the sequence of 
actions that Congress has taken with regard to Puerto Rico from 1900 to 2008). 
8. Id. 
9. Christina Duffy Burnett, “They Say I am Not an American . . .”: The Noncitizen 
National and the Law of American Empire, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 659, 714 (2008). 
10. Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Land that Democratic Theory Forgot, 83 IND. L.J. 1525, 
1540 (2008) (positing that through U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, “Congress holds 
plenary powers over the island,” but that “residents of Puerto Rico enjoy only those 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights deemed by the Court as fundamental”). But see infra 
notes 94–95 and accompanying text (describing the compact theory, which takes a 
different position on this issue). 
11. See infra note 120 (discussing the territorial incorporation doctrine, sometimes 
referred to as the “un-incorporation” or “unincorporation” doctrine). 
12. See infra notes 122–24 (discussing the seminal cases of Downes v. Bidwell, 182 
U.S. 244, 287 (1901), and Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309 (1922)). 
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receive equal treatment under the U.S. Constitution even though 
they are U.S. citizens13 and serve in the U.S. armed forces in large 
numbers.14 They cannot vote for the U.S. President,15 have no 
voting representative in the U.S. Congress,16 and they receive 
disproportionately lower levels of aid under various federal 
programs compared to U.S. state citizens.17 
Since Puerto Rico became a commonwealth,18 there has 
been a longstanding recognition that the island’s status is 
unsatisfactory.19 Despite removing Puerto Rico from the list of 
non-self-governing territories,20 the U.N. Decolonization 
Committee, for example, continues to monitor Puerto Rico’s 
 
13. See infra Part I.B.3 (providing an overview of the unequal treatment of Puerto 
Ricans with special attention to the doctrine of territorial incorporation). 
14. See Hearing on H.R. 2499 Before the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 111th Cong. 
11 (2009) [hereinafter H. Hearing on H.R. 2499] (testimony of Rep. Dan Burton) 
(“Puerto Ricans have fought in our wars as proud U.S. citizens. In fact, Puerto Ricans 
have sent more of their sons and daughters to serve in the United States military than all 
but one other state.”); Maurice Ferre, Presidential Race: Puerto Rico’s Ironic Role, MIAMI 
HERALD, May 30, 2008, at A17 (“In our current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there are 
more Puerto Ricans serving, per capita, than residents from 49 states.”). 
15. See, e.g., Igartúa-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(holding that the people of Puerto Rico have neither a constitutional right nor a claim 
in international law to vote in the presidential election); see also infra notes 126–27 and 
accompanying text (discussing Igartúa-De La Rosa in more detail). 
16. See infra note 85 and accompanying text (referring to the Foraker Act, which 
established a nonvoting Resident Commissioner in Congress). 
17. See John D. Ingram, Puerto Rican Independence: Whose Choice? The People of Puerto 
Rico or the United States Government?, 2001 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 85, 93–94 
(2001) (“Puerto Rican citizens are less favorably treated under some federal benefit 
programs, most notably Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Medicaid and food 
stamps.”); JOELY B. ROMAN OQUENDO & SONIA M. PÉREZ, NAT’L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, 
TANF IMPLEMENTATION IN PUERTO RICO: A SUMMARY OF DATA ON LEAVERS 8 (2004) 
(“[A]lthough Puerto Rico is required to meet the same [federal guideline] 
requirements as the states, the island does not receive funding to implement the TANF 
[Temporary Assistance for Needy Families] program comparable to that received by the 
states.”). 
18. See infra note 92 and accompanying text (noting that Puerto Rico’s 
commonwealth status officially came to being on July 25, 1952). 
19. See, e.g., Nelson D. Hermilla, Puerto Rico 1898–1998: The Institutionalization of 
Second Class Citizenship?, 16 DICK. J. INT’L L. 275, 284 (1998) (“[A]lthough the political 
parties in Puerto Rico disagree on the exact nature of any change of status, they all 
agree that the present political and legal relationship of Puerto Rico with the United 
States is unsatisfactory.”); see also Lisa Napoli, The Puerto Rican Independistas: Combatants 
in the Fight for Self-Determination and the Right to Prisoner of War Status, 4 CARDOZO J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 131, 146 (1996) (“The United States is beginning to react internally to the 
increasing international consciousness of Puerto Rico’s unsatisfactory political status.”). 
20. See infra note 100 and accompanying text (referring to Generally Assembly 
Resolution 748). 
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status and call upon the United States to facilitate the process of 
self-determination in Puerto Rico.21 Moreover, three plebiscites 
and one referendum22 held in Puerto Rico since 1967 have 
proved inconclusive,23 and the creation of the President’s Task 
Force on Puerto Rico’s Status in 2005 has yet to yield any 
meaningful resolution to the island’s political status.24 President 
 
21. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
22. There is considerable confusion over the terms “plebiscite” and “referendum” 
with regard to the principle of self-determination. Most scholars appear to agree that 
both devices constitute a process whereby people are consulted on a particular issue. See 
Ruth E. Gordon, Some Legal Problems with Trusteeship, 28 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 301, 347 
n.121 (1995) (“Plebiscite is a subset of the larger category of referendum. It is a type of 
referendum wherein the proposal at issue concerns the matter of sovereignty.”); Russell 
A. Miller, Self-Determination in International Law and the Demise of Democracy?, 41 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L 601, 626 n.94 (2003) (“Both plebiscites and referendums are methods of 
submitting an important measure to direct vote of the people.” (quoting J. PATRICK 
BOYER, LAWMAKING BY THE PEOPLE: REFERENDUMS AND PLEBISCITES IN CANADA 13 
(1982))); see also Zejnullah Gruda, Some Key Principles for a Lasting Solution of the Status of 
Kosova: Uti Possidetis, the Ethnic Principle, and Self-Determination, 80 CHI.–KENT L. REV. 353, 
369–70 (2005) (“A plebiscite is a vote by which the people of an entire country express 
an opinion for or against a proposal, especially on a choice of government or ruler.”); 
Dorian A. Shaw, Note, The Status of Puerto Rico Visited: Does the Current U.S.–Puerto Rico 
Relationship Uphold International Law?, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1006, 1061 (1994) (“A 
‘plebiscite’ is a ‘vote of the people expressing their choice for or against a proposed law 
or enactment, submitted to them, and which, if adopted, will work a change in the 
constitution, or which is beyond the powers of the regular legislative body.’” (quoting 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1153 (6th ed. 1990))). Scholars, however, disagree on the 
binding nature of these devices. Compare Anthony M. Stevens-Arroyo, Island in the Sun?, 
NEWSDAY (New York), Mar. 22, 1989, at 66 (defining a plebiscite as “an internationally 
supervised procedure of self-determination, in which before the vote, foreign troops of 
occupation are removed and all colonial claims have to be renounced in favor of the 
people’s freedom” and defining a referendum as “a non-binding consultation in which 
Congress has the last word, like a parent in an argument with a child”), with Municipal 
World, Plebiscites and Referendums, http://www.municipalworld.com/index.php/
Elections/PlebiscitesAndReferendums (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (defining plebiscite as 
“[t]he public expression of a community’s opinion without binding force” and 
referendum as “[t]he process of referring a political question to the electorate for a 
direct decision by general vote”). This Note takes no position on this issue, except to 
point out that the plebiscites and referendum held in Puerto Rico were nonbinding 
because they took place without prior approval from Congress. See infra Part II.A.2 
(discussing the legality of the plebiscites and referendum held in Puerto Rico).  
23. For information on the 1991 referendum, see infra notes 153–57 (discussing 
the 1991 referendum held in Puerto Rico). For information on the three plebiscites, see 
infra notes 148–52, 158–73 (providing an overview of the 1967, 1993, and 1998 
plebiscites). 
24. See infra notes 185–86 and accompanying text (describing the task force’s 
recommendation for a federally-sanctioned plebiscite to be held in Puerto Rico). 
Although bills following the task force’s recommendation have been introduced in 
Congress, none have passed. See infra notes 188–89 (listing different versions of the 
  
1052 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:1048 
Barack Obama has, however, indicated that he will work to 
resolve Puerto Rico’s political status during his administration.25 
According to President Obama, “self-determination is a basic 
right that has to be addressed, no matter how difficult.”26 
In the case of Puerto Rico, the exercise of self-determination 
has raised, and continues to raise, particularly difficult questions 
that have not been adequately addressed. Indeed, as legal 
scholars Gary Lawson and Robert Sloane observe in a recent 
article, “[t]he profound issues raised by the domestic and 
international legal status of Puerto Rico need to be faced and 
resolved.”27 Accordingly, this Note focuses on the application of 
the principle of self-determination to the people of Puerto Rico. 
Part I provides an overview of the development of the principle 
of self-determination in international law and Puerto Rico’s 
commonwealth status. Part II provides background information 
on the political status debate in Puerto Rico and focuses on three 
key issues that arise in the context of self-determination in Puerto 
Rico. Part III explains why Puerto Rico’s political status needs to 
be resolved and how the process of self-determination should 
proceed in Puerto Rico. Ultimately, this Note contends that the 
people of Puerto Rico have yet to fully exercise their right to self-
determination. 
I. BACKGROUND ON PUERTO RICO’S POLITICAL STATUS 
What does the principle of self-determination mean for the 
people of Puerto Rico, and how should it be applied? These are 
the underlying questions that this Note seeks to explore. Part I of 
this Note focuses on the ambiguous principle of self-
determination and its application in the case of Puerto Rico.  
 
“Puerto Rico Democracy Act,” one of which, H.R. 2499, is currently pending in the 
House of Representatives). 
25. See Jeannette Rivera-Lyles, Obama Vows to Solve Puerto Rico’s Status, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL, Jan. 13, 2009, at A5 (noting that Obama pledged to “enable the question of 
Puerto Rico’s status to be resolved” during his first term in a letter to Governor Luis 
Fortuño); see also Karen J. Carrillo, New U.S. Policies Toward Puerto Rico and Cuba?, N.Y. 
AMSTERDAM NEWS, Jan. 15, 2009, at 2 (discussing President Obama’s commitment to 
resolving Puerto Rico’s political status). 
26. Carrillo, supra note 25, at 2 (quoting a statement from Obama read by a 
representative). 
27. Gary Lawson & Robert Sloane, The Constitutionality of Decolonization by Associated 
Statehood: Puerto Rico’s Legal Status Reconsidered, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1123, 1125 (2009). 
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Part I.A provides a brief overview of the principle of self-
determination in international law. It discusses the emergence of 
this principle and its development through several international 
instruments. Part I.A also focuses on the distinction between 
internal and external self-determination. Part II.B focuses on the 
colonial relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico 
and the island’s commonwealth status. In addition, Part II.B 
describes the United Nations’ role in determining Puerto Rico’s 
commonwealth status. 
A. The Principle of Self-Determination 
The principle of self-determination came into acceptance 
during the twentieth century as having played a significant role in 
ending colonialism. Yet, the precise scope and meaning of the 
principle of self-determination in international law remains 
unclear.28 Despite its ambiguity, the principle of self-
determination remains one of the important principles in 
modern international law. 
1. The Emergence of the Principle of Self-Determination 
The principle of self-determination in international law 
primarily emerged from the periods following World War I and 
World War II.29 Following the victory of the Allies in World War I, 
the principle of self-determination became the vehicle for 
 
28. See HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE 
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 27 (rev. ed. 1996) (“Perhaps no 
contemporary norm of international law has been so vigorously promoted or widely 
accepted as the right of all peoples to self-determination. Yet the meaning and content 
of that right remain as vague and imprecise as when they were enunciated by President 
Woodrow Wilson and others at Versailles.”); see also Mitchell A. Hill, What the Principle of 
Self-Determination Means Today, 1 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 119, 120 (1995) (“There is no 
clear consensus . . . as to what the meaning and content of that right is, and it has gained 
the distinction of ‘being one of the most confused expressions in the lexicon of 
international relations.’” (quoting W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-
DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW vii (1977))). 
29. See Hill, supra note 28, at 121 (noting that the principle of self-determination 
developed from “the post-World War I period of nationalism and the post-World War II 
period of decolonization”); Melissa A. Jamison, Rural Electric Cooperatives: A Model for 
Indigenous Peoples’ Permanent Sovereignty Over their Natural Resources, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 401, 422 (2005) (“Self-determination developed as a principle of international 
law during the period between World War I and World War II.”). 
  
1054 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:1048 
redividing Europe.30 In an address to the U.S. Senate, President 
Wilson declared that “[n]o peace can last, or ought to last, which 
does not recognize and accept the principle that governments 
derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and 
that no right anywhere exists to hand people about from 
sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property.”31  
Initially, the principle of self-determination only applied to 
newly-created nations within the defeated Austro-Hungarian and 
Ottoman empires.32 The idea of expanding the principle further 
jeopardized the stability of world order and may have conflicted 
with the interests of the Allies.33 Thus, self-determination during 
the post World War I period did not apply to colonies held by the 
Allies. Following World War II, however, self-determination 
served as a legal basis for justifying the process of 
decolonization.34  
 
30. See HANNUM, supra note 28, at 27–28 (“With the disintegration of the Austro-
Hungarian and Ottoman empires during World War I, . . . the principle of self-
determination became the obvious vehicle for the re-division of Europe by the victorious 
powers.”); Inge V. Porter, Two Case Studies in Self-Determination: The Rock and the Bailiwick, 
4 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 339, 343 (2003) (“Most commentators agree that the modern 
understanding of the principle of self-determination started with the dismantling of the 
Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires after the First World War.”). 
31. 54 CONG. REC. 1741, 1742 (1917) (address by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson). 
32. See HANNUM, supra note 28, at 28 (“Self-determination was considered only for 
‘nations’ which were within the territory of the defeated empires; it was never thought to 
apply to overseas colonies.”); Johan D. van der Vyver, Universality and Relativity of Human 
Rights: American Relativism, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 43, 50 n.26 (1998) (“Initially, when 
World War I was drawing to a close, the idea of self-determination of peoples was 
advanced to legitimize the disintegration of the world empires of the time, and within 
that meaning entailed the right of ‘peoples’ in the sense of (territorially defined) 
nations to political independence.”). 
33. See HANNUM, supra note 28, at 28 (“[S]elf-determination in 1919 had little to 
do with the demands of the peoples concerned, unless those demands were consistent 
with the geopolitical and strategic interests of the Great Powers.”); see also Hill, supra 
note 28, at 122 (“Wilson and the other world leaders realized that they could not extend 
the right of self-determination beyond the confines of Europe without greatly disturbing 
the world order.”). 
34. See Hill, supra note 28, at 122 (“Since 1945 the principle of self-determination 
primarily has been used to provide a legal basis for the process of decolonization.”); 
Christopher J. Borgen, The Language of Law and the Practice of Politics: Great Powers and the 
Rhetoric of Self-Determination in the Cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 8 
(2009) (noting that self-determination was understood as another word for 
decolonization in the 1960s). 
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2. Self-Determination in the U.N. Charter 
The U.N. Charter mentions the principle of self-
determination in articles 1(2)35 and 55.36 These articles propose 
that friendly relations between nations “be based on respect for 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,”37 
putting self-determination at the forefront of international 
relations.38 The U.N. Charter, however, frames self-determination 
very broadly, and vaguely defines what constitutes a “people.”39 
Moreover, the U.N. Charter balances articles 1(2) and 55 against 
article 2(7), which states that “[n]othing contained in the 
present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene 
in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction.”40 For this reason, the principle of self-
determination most likely did not constitute a rule of 
 
35. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2 (stating that one of the purposes of the United 
Nations was “[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other 
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace”). 
36. U.N. Charter art. 55 (“With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and 
well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based 
on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the 
United Nations shall promote: a. higher standards of living, full employment, and 
conditions of economic and social progress and development; b. solutions of 
international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural 
and educational cooperation; and c. universal respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion.”). 
37. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2. 
38. See JAMES SUMMERS, PEOPLES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW NATIONALISM AND 
SELF-DETERMINATION SHAPE A CONTEMPORARY LAW OF NATIONS 149 (2007) (stating that 
articles 1(2) and 55 of the U.N. Charter “put self-determination at the foundations of 
the international community”); see also Patrick Macklem, Militant Democracy, Legal 
Pluralism, and the Paradox of Self-Determination, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 488, 500 (2006) (“The 
principle of self-determination receives freestanding international legal affirmation in 
article 1(2) of the charter of the United Nations, which lists it as one of the purposes of 
the United Nations, and article 55 of the charter . . . .”). 
39. See SUMMERS, supra note 38, at 150 (“The equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples was framed in general terms in the Charter, without the peoples being specified. 
Definitions of what a people might be were particularly vague.”); see also Csaba K. 
Zoltani & Frank Koszorus, Jr. Group Rights Defuse Tensions, 20 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 
133, 140 (1996) (“Articles 1 and 55 of the U.N. Charter refer to the self-determination of 
peoples but treat it as a vague principle, not necessarily as a right, and apply it to 
territories rather than to ethnic groups.”). 
40. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. 
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international law when the U.N. Charter was drafted, despite its 
political significance.41 
Chapters XII–XIII (articles 75–91) of the U.N. Charter 
relate to trust territories—territories that the League of Nations 
held after World War I and World War II, and territories that 
administering states voluntarily placed under the International 
Trusteeship System.42 Eleven territories were placed under the 
trusteeship system during the early years of the United Nations.43 
Since then, those territories have achieved independence or 
voluntarily associated themselves with a state, with Palau as the 
last trust territory to achieve self-governance by entering into free 
association with the United States in 1994.44 
Chapter XI (articles 73–74) relates to non-self-governing 
territories—territories with peoples who have yet to achieve “a 
full measure of self-government,” as defined by General Assembly 
Resolution 1541 (XV).45 Today, sixteen non-self-governing 
territories, primarily located in the Atlantic and Caribbean, 
remain.46 Most former non-self-governing territories, such as 
 
41. See HANNUM, supra note 28, at 33 (“There is probably a consensus among 
scholars that, whatever its political significance, the principle of self-determination did 
not rise to the level of a rule of international law at the time the U.N. Charter was 
drafted.”); Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 12 (1993) 
[hereinafter Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination] (“Whatever its political significance, 
the principle of self-determination had not attained the status of a rule of international 
law by the time of the drafting of the United Nations Charter or in the early United 
Nations era.”). 
42. See International Trusteeship System, http://www.un.org/depts/dpi/
decolonization/trust.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2009) (describing the International 
Trusteeship System established in 1945). 
43. See Trust Territories that Have Achieved Self-Determination, 
http://www.un.org/depts/dpi/decolonization/trust4.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) 
(listing Cameroons under British administration, Cameroons under French 
administration, Nauru, New Guinea, Ruanda-Urundi, Somaliland, Tanganyika, 
Togoland under British administration, Togoland under French administration, Trust 
Territory of the Pacific Islands (Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 
Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands) and 
Western Samoa as trusteeship territories). 
44. See id. (listing the current status of each territory); see also Internationall 
Trusteeship System, supra note 42 (“Today, all 11 Territories have either become 
independent States or have voluntary associated themselves with a State. With no 
Territories left in its agenda, the Trusteeship System had completed its historic task.”). 
45. See infra notes 67–68 (providing an overview of General Assembly Resolution 
1541). 
46. See Non-Self-Governing Territories Listed by the 2002 General Assembly, 
http://www.un.org/depts/dpi/decolonization/trust3.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) 
(listing American Samoa, Anguilla Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman 
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Timor-Leste, have become independent states.47 A few territories, 
such as Goa, have been incorporated into an existing state.48 
Other territories, such as the Cook Islands and Niue Island, have 
entered into free associations49 with other states.50 Finally, some 
territories, such as Macao and Hong Kong, have been removed 
from the list of non-self-governing territories based on special 
circumstances.51 Puerto Rico also falls under the latter category, 
 
Islands, the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), Gibraltar, Guam, Montserrat, New Caledonia,  
Pitcairn, St. Helena, Tokelau, Turks and Caicos Islands, the United States Virgin Islands, 
and Western Sahara as non-self-governing territories). 
47. See Andrew Townend, Tokelau’s 2006 Referendum on Self-Government, 5 N.Z. J. 
PUB. & INT’L L. 121, 125 (2007) (“For most non-self-governing territories that have been 
decolonised under United Nations auspices, self-government has meant 
independence.”); CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE CIA WORLD FACTBOOK: 2010, at 
674 (2009) (noting that Timor-Leste was internationally recognized as an independent 
state on May 20, 2002). 
48. See HANNUM, supra note 28, at 40 n.128 (“Goa and other Portuguese 
dependencies in India . . . were incorporated into India in 1961[.]”); Robert 
McCorquodale, Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach, 43 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 857, 
881 (1994) (“[T]he international community recognised the incorporation of Goa into 
India . . . .”). 
49. See HANNUM, supra note 28, at 17 (“Associated statehood is a relatively modern 
concept that has arisen out of United Nations discussions with respect to the exercise of 
self-determination by non-self-governing territories. The modern associated state is 
perhaps closest to a protected independent state, with an essential attribute being the 
ability unilaterally to terminate the ‘association’ with another state.”); Chimène I. 
Keitner & Michael Reisman, Free Association: The United States Experience, 39 TEX. INT’L 
L.J. 1, 2 (2003) (“An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily 
establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain 
responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a 
state. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and 
independence.”); see also KEITH BEA & R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
POLITICAL STATUS OF PUERTO RICO: OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32933.pdf (“[F]ree association generally implies 
negotiated legal, economic, or defense ties between two independent nations. Three 
former territories—the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), the Federated States of 
Micronesia (FSM), and the Republic of Palau (Palau)—are currently engaged in free 
association with the United States. (Following Word [sic] War II, the U.S. administered 
all three of those territories on behalf of the United Nations, although they were never 
U.S. territories per se.) Based on current compact agreements with the RMI, FSM, and 
Palau, the U.S. provides those countries with defense protection and various forms of 
economic aid. Citizens of the countries may work and attend school in the U.S., but they 
are not U.S. citizens.”). See generally Lawson & Sloane, supra note 28, at 1137–40 
(discussing associated statehood as a vehicle for self-determination). 
50. See HANNUM, supra note 28, at 40 n.128 (noting that the Cook Islands and Niue 
Island entered into a free association in 1965 and 1974 with New Zealand); Hannum, 
Rethinking Self-Determination, supra note 41, at 40 n.164 (stating the same). 
51. See HANNUM, supra note 28, at 40 n.128 (“Macao and Hong Kong . . . were 
removed from the list at the request of China, on the grounds that they were integral 
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as this Note explains below, regarding the circumstances leading 
to Puerto Rico’s removal from the list of non-self-governing 
territories.52 
3. Self-Determination in the Twin Covenants 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”)53 and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”),54 sometimes referred to 
as the “twin” covenants,55 also codify the principle of self-
determination.56 Article 1 of both the ICCPR and ICESCR states 
in relevant part: “All peoples have the right of self-determination. 
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.”57 The ICCPR also recognizes a right to popular 
participation—the individual right to freely participate in 
political affairs following the exercise of self-determination58—in 
 
parts of the Chinese state illegally occupied by Portugal and the United Kingdom, 
respectively . . . .”); Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, supra note 41, at 40 n.164 
(same). 
52. See infra Part I.B.2 (providing an overview of the circumstances that led to 
Puerto Rico’s removal from the list of non-self-governing territories under General 
Assembly Resolution 748 and the ensuing scholarly debate). 
53. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY 
DOC. NO. 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
54. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 
1966, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-19 (1978), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
55. See SUMMERS, supra note 38, at 154 (referring to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) as the “twin Human Rights Covenants”); Robert 
Charles Blitt, Who Will Watch the Watchdogs? Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations 
and the Case for Regulation, 10 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 268 (2004) (referring to the 
ICCPR and ICESCR as the “twin international covenants”). 
56. See Howard J. Vogel, Reframing Rights from the Ground Up: The Contribution of the 
New U.N. Law of Self-Determination to Recovering the Principle of Sociability on the Way to a 
Relational Theory of International Human Rights, 20 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 443, 452 
(2006) (“Both the ICCPR and its companion, the ICESCR, affirm the right to self-
determination.”); see also Borgen, supra note 34, at 7 (noting that article 1 of the ICCPR 
and ICESCR moved the concept of self-determination from an aspirational ideal to a 
recognized right). 
57. ICCPR, supra note 53, art. 1(1); ICESCR, supra note 54, art. 1(1). 
58. See Mary Ellen Turpel, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights of Political Participation and Self-
Determination: Recent International Legal Developments and the Continuing Struggle for 
Recognition, 25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 579, 591–92 (1992) (“Popular participation is the 
right of individuals, subsequent to the exercise of self-determination, to participate 
freely and effectively in the state and form of government chosen.”); see also Paul H. 
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article 25.59 The Senate, however, attached a “not self-executing” 
declaration to articles 1 through 27 of the ICCPR,60 which means 
that the ICCPR cannot be directly enforced in U.S. courts 
according to the U.S. Supreme Court.61 
4. Self-Determination in General Assembly Resolutions 
Although non-binding, U.N. General Assembly resolutions 
have helped facilitate the process of decolonization and the 
development of the principle of self-determination. General 
Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), entitled “Declaration on the 
granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples,” 
declares that “[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination” 
and that “[i]nadequacy of political, economic, social or 
educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for 
delaying independence.”62 In addition, Resolution 1514 called 
for immediate steps to be taken with regard to the existing trust 
and non-self-governing territories in 1960,63 facilitating the 
 
Brietzke, Self-Determination, or Jurisprudential Confusion: Exacerbating Political Conflict, 14 
WIS. INT’L L.J. 69, 114 n.116 (1995) (providing a similar definition). 
59. See ICCPR, supra note 53, art. 25 (“Every citizen shall have the right and the 
opportunity . . . without unreasonable restrictions: (a) [t]o take part in the conduct of 
public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) [t]o vote and to be 
elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and 
shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors; 
[and] (c) [t]o have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his 
country.”). 
60. See U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) 
(“[T]he United States declares that the provisions of Articles 1 through 27 of the 
Covenant are not self-executing.”). 
61. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004) (“[T]he Senate has 
expressly declined to give the federal courts the task of interpreting and applying 
international human rights law, as when its ratification of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights declared that the substantive provisions of the document were 
not self-executing.”); see also Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 121, 137 (2d Cir. 
2005) (“[T]he ICCPR, came with attached RUDs [Reservations, Understandings, and 
Declarations] declaring that the ICCPR is not self-executing. This declaration means 
that the provisions of the ICCPR do not create a private right of action or separate form 
of relief enforceable in United States courts.”). 
62. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), art. 2–3, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (Dec. 14, 1960). 
63. Id. art. 3 (“Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing 
Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer 
all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in 
accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, 
creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and 
freedom.”). 
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process of decolonization for those territories.64 Because of its 
significance, some have referred to Resolution 1514 as the 
“Magna Carta” of decolonization.65 
General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV), entitled 
“Principles which should guide Members in determining 
whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information 
called for under Article 73e of the Charter,” provides guidance 
to determine when an administering state must transmit 
statistical and other technical information about a non-self-
governing territory for monitoring purposes under article 7366 of 
the U.N. Charter.67 Principle VI to the annex of Resolution 1541 
identifies three status options that each constitute a full measure 
of self-government: “(a) Emergence as a sovereign independent 
State; (b) Free association with an independent State; or (c) 
Integration with an independent State.”68 Thus, if a non-self-
governing territory achieves any of the above measures of self-
government, the administering state no longer has an obligation 
to transmit information about that territory under article 73 of 
the U.N. Charter. As Part III points out, Puerto Rico has not 
achieved a “full measure of self-government” within the meaning 
of Resolution 1541 because Puerto Rico is not sovereign nation, 
 
64. See SUMMERS, supra note 38, at 194 (explaining how General Assembly 
Resolution 1514 “marked at [sic] turning point in the policy of the General Assembly 
towards colonial self-determination” and how the process of decolonization “gained 
momentum” at this time); Sompong Sucharitkul, Asian Perspectives of the Evolution of 
International Law: Thailand’s Experience at the Threshold of the Third Millennium, 2 CHINESE 
J. INT’L L. 527, 530 (2002) (“General Assembly Resolution 1514 in 1960 set into motion 
the irreversible process of decolonization of all territories which at that moment were 
still non-self-governing.”). 
65. See Porter, supra note 30, at 347 (noting that some scholars consider General 
Assembly Resolution 1514 the “Magna Carta” of decolonization); see also SUMMERS, supra 
note 38, at 195 (“The Colonial Independence Declaration has been called the ‘Magna 
Charta’ of decolonisation.”). 
66. U.N. Charter art. 73, para. e (stating that administering states have an 
obligation “to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, 
subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, 
statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and 
educational conditions in the [non-self-governing] territories for which they are 
respectively responsible”). 
67. G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), annex, U.N. Doc. A/4651 (Dec. 15, 1960) (outlining the 
principles to guide member states in the determination of whether they have an 
obligation under article 73 of the United Nations (“U.N.”) Charter to transmit 
information). 
68. Id. 
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in free association with the United States, and it is not a U.S. 
state.69 
General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), entitled 
“Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations,” expands on the list of 
status options that constitute a full measure of self-government.70 
In addition to independence, free association, and integration, 
Resolution 2625 recognizes “the emergence into any other 
political status freely determined by the people” as a mode of 
self-determination.71 Very little research has considered the 
validity of Puerto Rico’s status under Resolution 2625. At least 
one scholar, however, Steven Hillebrink, asserts that Puerto Rico 
does not satisfy Resolution 2625’s requirements.72 
4. Internal and External Self-Determination 
Contemporary questions about the principle of self-
determination center on two issues: whether it should apply 
outside the colonial context; and when oppressed minority 
groups within a state have a right to secede.73 The distinction 
 
69. See infra notes 233–34 and accompanying text (noting that Puerto Rico’s 
commonwealth status does not fit into any of the measures of self-government that 
General Assembly Resolution 1541 identifies). 
70. See Cherylyn Brandt Ahrens, Chechnya and the Right of Self-Determination, 42 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 575, 580 (2004) (“[T]he General Assembly seemed to expand 
the definition of self-determination beyond de-colonization with Resolution 2625 . . . .”); 
see also Eric Ting-lun Huang, The Evolution of the Concept of Self-Determination and the Right 
of the People of Taiwan to Self-Determination, 14 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 167, 180 (2001) (“When 
the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 2625 . . . there was no doubt that self-
determination might extend beyond the traditional notion of decolonization.”). 
71. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), annex, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
72. STEVEN HILLEBRINK, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND POST-COLONIAL 
GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES AND ARUBA 106–07 (2008) 
(stating that in terms of Resolution 2625, “[t]here seems to exist little doubt in the legal 
literature and otherwise that Puerto Rico’s status does not represent a full measure of 
self-government or a form of complete decolonization . . . [because] ‘there are obvious 
imperfections in the association status of Puerto Rico’, namely the reserved 
Congressional powers, the application of US Federal law in Puerto Rico, and the relative 
absence of Puerto Rico as an actor in international politics” (quoting W. MICHAEL 
REISMAN, PUERTO RICO AND THE INTERNATIONAL PROCESS: NEW ROLES IN ASSOCIATION, 
STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL POLICY 49 (1975))). 
73. See Hill, supra note 28, at 122–23 (explaining that the U.N. “has been far from 
clear regarding whether the right to self-determination should be extended beyond the 
colonial context and used as a basis for allowing the secession of oppressed minority 
groups within an independent state”). Compare Paul A. Clark, Taking Self-Determination 
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between internal self-determination and external self-
determination has emerged as one measure for identifying which 
rights a group enjoys under the principle of self-determination, 
including whether that group has a right to secede.74 Internal 
self-determination concerns the protection of a group’s rights 
within a state, and external self-determination concerns a group’s 
right to independence and statehood.75 
The Canadian Supreme Court clarified the distinction 
between internal and external self-determination in the 1998 
decision, Reference re Secession of Quebec.76 According to the court, 
internal self-determination refers to “a people’s pursuit of its 
political, economic, social and cultural development within the 
framework of an existing state,” and external self-determination, 
as stated in Resolution 2625, refers to “[t]he establishment of a 
 
Seriously: When Can Cultural and Political Minorities Control their Own Fates?, 5 CHI. J. INT’L 
L. 737, 743 (2005) (“Despite the attempt by leaders of many existing states to limit the 
idea of self-determination (say, for example, to limit its application to colonialism), most 
commentators have concluded that that attempt has failed, as more and more groups 
seek recognition as ‘a people,’ and the international community repeatedly finds that 
the best way to end a civil war, or oppression of a minority, is the separation of the 
warring groups into separate states.”), with Frances Raday, Self-Determination and Minority 
Rights, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 453, 459 (2003) (“The applicability of the right [of 
external self-determination] to peoples has been said to make it inapplicable to 
minorities, a distinction which emerges from the ICCPR, which regulates the rights of 
minorities in Article 27 and reserves the right to self-determination to peoples in Article 
1.”). For a thorough discussion on the application of the principle of self-determination 
to noncolonial and minority groups, see Geoff Gilbert, Autonomy and Minority Groups: A 
Right in International Law?, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 307, 336–39 (2002). 
74. See Special Committee on European Affairs of the New York City Bar, Executive 
Summary: Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist Crisis in Moldova, 14 ILSA 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 379, 383–84 (2008) (“The norm of self-determination is not a 
general right of secession. It is the right of a people to decide on their culture, language, 
and government. It has evolved into the concepts of ‘internal self-determination,’ the 
protection of minority rights within a state, and ‘external self-determination,’ secession 
from a state. While self-determination is an internationally recognized principle, 
secession is considered a domestic issue that each state must assess itself.”); Minasse 
Haile, Legality of Secessions: The Case of Eritrea, 8 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 479, 481 (1994) 
(“We must distinguish the right to enjoy human rights domestically—‘internal self-
determination’—from the right of a group in an independent state to secede-‘external 
self-determination.’”). 
75. See SUMMERS, supra note 38, at 31–32 (“Internal self-determination relates to 
the exercise of the right within a state,” and “[e]xternal self-determination is more 
concerned with the right of peoples to independence and statehood.”); see also ; Haile, 
supra note 74 (providing a similar definition for the notions of internal and external 
self-determination); Special Committee on European Affairs of the New York City Bar, 
supra note 74 (same). 
76. [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. 
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sovereign and independent State, the free association or 
integration with an independent State or the emergence into any 
other political status freely determined by a people . . . .”77  
The court further explained that external self-determination 
could be exercised in cases concerning colonial peoples—
peoples “subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation 
outside a colonial context”—78 and, as a last resort, in situations 
where “a people is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its 
right to self-determination internally.”79 The court concluded 
that the people of Quebec did not fall into any of these 
circumstances simply because they failed to reach an agreement 
with the government on amendments to Canada’s constitution.80 
Accordingly, they did not have an external right of self-
determination to secede from Canada.81 As Part III of this Note 
observes, it is unclear whether Puerto Rico qualifies as a case of 
internal or external self-determination because of the island’s 
ambiguous political status.82 
B. Puerto Rico’s Commonwealth Status 
In order to appreciate the complexity surrounding the 
exercise of self-determination in Puerto Rico, it is important to 
understand the circumstances that led to the island’s 
establishment as a commonwealth. Part I.B will, therefore, focus 
 
77. Id. at 282 (quoting G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 71, annex, ¶ 1). 
78. Id. at 285. 
79. Id. at 285–86. 
80. See id. at 287 (“The continuing failure to reach agreement on amendments to 
the Constitution, while a matter of concern, does not amount to a denial of self-
determination. In the absence of amendments to the Canadian Constitution, we must 
look at the constitutional arrangements presently in effect, and we cannot conclude 
under current circumstances that those arrangements place Quebecers in a 
disadvantaged position within the scope of the international law rule.”). 
81. See id. at 287 (“In summary, the international law right to self-determination 
only generates, at best, a right to external self-determination in situations of former 
colonies; where a people is oppressed, as for example under foreign military occupation; 
or where a definable group is denied meaningful access to government to pursue their 
political, economic, social and cultural development. In all three situations, the people 
in question are entitled to a right to external self-determination because they have been 
denied the ability to exert internally their right to self-determination. Such exceptional 
circumstances are manifestly inapplicable to Quebec under existing conditions.”). 
82. See infra notes 239–43 and accompanying text (noting how Puerto Rico can be 
classified as either a case of internal or external self-determination, depending on how 
one views the nature of the island’s political status). 
  
1064 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:1048 
on the colonial relationship between the United States and 
Puerto Rico. Special attention is given to the debate surrounding 
the United Nations’ removal of Puerto Rico from the list of non-
self-governing territories in 1953 and the unequal treatment of 
the people of Puerto Rico based on the U.S. territorial 
incorporation doctrine. 
1. Establishment of Puerto Rico’s Commonwealth Status 
After Puerto Rico became a U.S. colony in 1898 following 
the Spanish-American War,83 Congress granted Puerto Rico a 
measured degree of autonomy from 1900 to 1947. First, Congress 
passed the Organic Act of Puerto Rico, also known as the Foraker 
Act of 1900,84 which established a local civil government in 
Puerto Rico and a non-voting resident commissioner in 
Congress.85 Next, Congress conferred statutory U.S. citizenship 
on people born in Puerto Rico with the Jones Act of 1917.86 The 
Jones Act also established an elected senate and house of 
representatives within Puerto Rico.87 Finally, Congress amended 
the Organic Act of Puerto Rico in 1947 to allow the people of 
Puerto Rico to elect their own governor.88 
The approval of Public Law 600 in 1950 authorized the 
Puerto Rican legislature to draft a local constitution for the 
island subject to the approval of the people of Puerto Rico and 
Congress.89 Congress adopted Public Law 600, “in the nature of a 
 
83. Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Spain, art. II, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754 (“Spain cedes to 
the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish 
sovereignty in the West Indies, and the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones.”). 
84. An Act Temporarily To Provide Revenues and a Civil Government for Porto 
Rico, and for Other Purposes (Foraker Act), ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900) (codified as 
amended at 48 U.S.C. § 731–916 (2006)). 
85. See id. § 39. 
86. An Act to Provide a Civil Government for Porto Rico, and for Other Purposes 
(Jones Act), § 5, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (1917) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1402 
(2006) (granting U.S. citizenship to all citizens of Puerto Rico). 
87. See id. §§ 25–27 (establishing a legislature in Puerto Rico). 
88. See An Act to Amend the Organic Act of Puerto Rico (The Elective Governor’s 
Act), ch. 490, § 1, 61 Stat. 770, 770–71 (1947) (“[T]he Governor of Puerto Rico shall be 
elected by the qualified voters of Puerto Rico . . . .”). 
89. An Act to Provide for the Organization of a Constitutional Government by the 
People of Puerto Rico (Public Law 600), §§ 1–2, ch. 446, Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319 
(1950) (codified at 48 U.S.C. §§ 731b–731c (2006)) (“[T]his act is now adopted in the 
nature of a compact so that the people of Puerto Rico may organize a government 
pursuant to a constitution of their own adoption.”). 
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compact.”90 Voters ratified the proposed constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico on March 3, 1952.91 Congress 
approved the proposed constitution chosen by the people of 
Puerto Rico on July 3, 1952, and, on July 25, 1952, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico officially came into being.92 
The compact language of Public Law 600 has been the 
subject of much scholarly debate.93 Compact theorists believe 
that Congress gave up its plenary power over Puerto Rico when it 
passed Public Law 600.94 Thus, they also believe that Puerto Rico 
ceased to be a U.S. colony when it became a commonwealth in 
1952.95 Territorial supremacy theorists, on the other hand, argue 
 
90. Id. § 731b. 
91. See CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 47, at 552 (stating that the Puerto 
Rican constitution was ratified on March 3, 1952, and approved by the U.S. Congress on 
July 3, 1952). 
92. See id. (stating that the Puerto Rican constitution became effective on July 25, 
1952). In Spanish, the official name of Puerto Rico is, “Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto 
Rico,” which in English means, “Associated Free State of Puerto Rico.” See Lisa Napoli, 
The Legal Recognition of the National Identity of a Colonized People: The Case of Puerto Rico, 18 
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 159, 194 n.19 (1998); see also Rafael A. Declet, Jr., The Mandate 
Under International Law for a Self-Executing Plebiscite on Puerto Rico’s Political Status, and the 
Right of U.S.-Resident Puerto Ricans to Participate, 28 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 19, 34 
(2001) (describing the dispute over the name of Puerto Rico’s new status as a 
commonwealth). 
93. Christina Duffy Burnett, Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial 
Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 872 (2005) (“Puerto Rico’s status debate has 
largely focused on the ‘compact’ theory. At issue is whether Puerto Rico and the United 
States may enter into a permanent union, or ‘compact,’ without either Puerto Rico 
becoming a state of the Union, or the United States amending its Constitution.”); 
Ediberto Román & Theron Simmons, Membership Denied: Subordination and Subjugation 
Under United States Expansionism, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 437, 483 (2002) (“[A] central 
debate in Puerto Rico’s political sovereignty debate in the territory is whether the 
creation of the commonwealth status was the result of a compact between equals.”) see 
also infra notes 94–98 (providing an overview of the views of compact, territorial 
supremacists, and conventional entrenchment theorists). 
94. See David A. Rezvani, The Basis of Puerto Rico’s Constitutional Status: Colony, 
Compact, or “Federacy”? 122 POL. SCI. Q. 115, 123 (2007) (stating that the compact theory 
school of thought “argues that Congress legally does not have plenary power over 
Puerto Rico”); see also Otaño, supra note 4, at 1810 (describing the view that both Puerto 
Rico and the United States are bound by a compact and therefore neither party can 
denounce the compact without the permission of the other party). 
95. See Carlos R. Soltero, Is Puerto Rico a “Sovereign” for Purposes of the Dual 
Sovereignty Exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause?, 28 REV. JUR. U. INTER.-AM. P.R. 183, 191 
(1994) (describing the view that “Puerto Rico in 1952 ceased to be an ‘unincorporated 
territory’ or a colony” when it became a commonwealth); see also José Trías Monge, 
Plenary Power and the Principle of Liberty: An Alternative View of the Political Condition of 
Puerto Rico, 68 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1, 23 (1999) (“Defenders of Commonwealth status claim 
that Puerto Rico became free upon the establishment of the Commonwealth.”). 
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that that the Territorial Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
ultimately controls the relationship between Puerto Rico and the 
United States; so Congress did not give up its plenary power over 
Puerto Rico by passing Public Law 600.96  
At least one scholar, David A. Rezvani, takes a middle 
position, which he refers to as the “conventional entrenchment 
theory.”97 This theory holds that that Congress still has legal 
plenary power over Puerto Rico, but nonlegal conventions have 
nullified this power and have frozen the application of the 
Territorial Clause with respect to Puerto Rico.98 The Honorable 
Gustavo A. Gelpí also appears to take a middle position on the 
nature of the relationship between the United States and Puerto 
Rico, given his conclusion that, based on legislative actions taken 
since 1900, Congress has impliedly incorporated Puerto Rico into 
the United States.99 
2. Removal of Puerto Rico from the List of Non-Self-Governing 
Territories  
In 1953, the United Nations passed General Assembly 
Resolution 748 (VIII), entitled “Cessation of the transmission of 
information under Article 73(e) of the Charter in respect of 
Puerto Rico,” thereby removing Puerto Rico from the list of non-
self-governing territories.100 According to Resolution 748, the 
people of Puerto Rico exercised their right to self-determination 
by the terms of the island’s newly acquired status as a 
 
96. See Rezvani, supra note 94, at 124 (“Members of this school emphasize the 
overriding legal force of the territorial clause of the U.S. Constitution” and “reject any 
notion that the vague references to ‘compact’ in Puerto Rico’s constitution have any 
binding force.”); see also Otaño, supra note 4, at 1810 (explaining that others believe that 
Puerto Rico’s status as an unincorporated territory of the United States “has changed 
little since the early twentieth century”). 
97. Rezvani, supra note 94, at 125 (introducing the conventional entrenchment 
theory). 
98. See id. (stating that the conventional entrenchment theory “claims that 
Congress’ plenary power is indeed legally intact but nevertheless nullified and rendered 
inoperable by conventional rules”). 
99. See supra notes 7–8 (discussing the Consejo de Salud Playa Ponce holding). 
100. G.A. Res. 748 (VIII), ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (Nov. 27, 1953) (“[I]n the 
framework of their Constitution and of the compact agreed upon with the United States 
of America, the people of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have been invested with 
attributes of political sovereignty which clearly identify the status of self-government 
attained by the Puerto Rican people as that of an autonomous political entity . . . .”). 
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commonwealth in 1952.101 As such, the United States no longer 
had an obligation to provide reports to the United Nations on 
Puerto Rico’s progress toward decolonization and self-
government.102 The General Assembly passed Resolution 748 by a 
relatively slim margin of twenty-two to eighteen with nineteen 
abstentions.103  
One reason for this close vote may have been the extent to 
which Puerto Rico’s relationship with the United States does not 
satisfy the criteria set forth in General Assembly Resolution 742 
(VIII), entitled “Factors which should be taken into account in 
deciding whether a Territory is or is not a Territory whose people 
have not yet attained a full measure of self-government.”104 The 
annex of Resolution 742 contains three parts, which outline 
factors indicative of the attainment of independence, free 
association with a territory on an equal basis, and separate 
systems of self-government.105 Some authors, such as Jason Adolfo 
Otaño and Dorian A. Shaw, claim that Puerto Rico’s 
commonwealth status does not satisfy the factors indicative of a 
free association with the United States.106 Another scholar, Arron 
Guevara, asserts that Puerto Rico has not attained a legitimate 
status as a separate system of self-government because Public Law 
600 did not allow the people of Puerto Rico to choose among 
various possibilities, including independence.107 
 
101. See id. ¶ 4 (“[W]hen choosing their constitutional and international status, the 
people of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have effectively exercised their right to 
self-determination . . . .”). 
102. See id. (agreeing that the United States should no longer be required to 
transmit information concerning Puerto Rico pursuant to article 73(e) of the U.N. 
Charter). 
103. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-131, pt. 1, at 2 (1997); see also 1999 LULAC Resolutions, 
Puerto Rico Resolution 10, http://www.lulac.org/advocacy/resolutions/resolve99.html 
(last visited Nov. 23, 2009). 
104. G.A. Res. 742 (VIII), U.N. Doc. A/2630 (Nov. 27, 1953). 
105. See id. annex (identifying “Factors Indicative of the Attainment of 
Independence” in the “First part”; “Factors Indicative of the Attainment of Other 
Separate Systems of Self-Government” in the “Second part”; and “Factors Indicative of 
the Free Association of a Territory on Equal Basis with the Metropolitan or Other 
Country as an Integral Part of that Country or in Any Other Form” in the “Third part”). 
106. See Otaño, supra note 4, at 1855 (“Of the fifteen factors indicative of free 
association, the P.R. Commonwealth arrangement fails to fulfill five.”); see also Shaw, 
supra note 22, at 1056 (arguing that the unequal treatment of the people of Puerto Rico 
by the United States violates General Assembly Resolution 742). 
107. Arron Guevara, Puerto Rico: Manifestations of Colonialism, 26 REV. JUR. U. INTER-
AM. P.R. 275, 288 (1992) (“Under the ‘Factors Indicative of the Attainment of Other 
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Despite removing Puerto Rico from the list of non-self-
governing territories, the U.N. Decolonization Committee has 
continued to monitor the island’s status.108 The Decolonization 
Committee has prepared several reports and drafted resolutions 
(some of which have been adopted), reiterating the people of 
Puerto Rico’s right to self-determination under Resolution 
1514.109 In addition, the Decolonization Committee has 
repeatedly called upon the United States to expedite the process 
of self-determination for the people of Puerto Rico.110 
3. Unequal Treatment of the People of Puerto Rico Under the 
Commonwealth Status 
Puerto Rico’s commonwealth status offers the people of 
Puerto Rico certain advantages and disadvantages. In terms of 
advantages, although they pay local income taxes and Social 
Security taxes, the people of Puerto Rico do not pay federal 
 
Separate Systems of Self-Government’ consideration is given in paragraph (A)(2) to the 
freedom of choosing ‘between several possibilities, including independence.’ Puerto 
Rico was only given one choice, however, either accept Pub. L. 600, and gain a little 
more autonomy, or continue with the status quo.” (quoting G.A. Res. 742, supra note 
105, annex, pt. 2, ¶ (A)(2)) (footnotes omitted))). 
108. See Jesus G. Roman, Does International Law Govern Puerto Rico’s November 1993 
Plebiscite?, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 98, 135 (1995) (“[T]he United Nations has continued to 
monitor the United States-Puerto Rico relationship through the Decolonization 
Committee . . . .”); see also Bashar Ja’afari, U.N. Special Comm. on the Situation with 
Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples, Special Comm. Decision of 9 June 2008 Concerning Puerto 
Rico, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/2009/L.13 (Mar. 17, 2009) (listing Decolonization 
Committee reports with information on actions with respect to Puerto Rico that the 
United Nations has taken prior to 1974 through 2007). 
109. See generally U.N. Special Comm. Decisions on Puerto Rico, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/decolonization/docs_reports_rapporteur.htm (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2010) (providing links to decolonization committee reports on Puerto 
Rico from 2003 to 2009). 
110. E.g. U.N. Special Comm. on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation 
of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 
Special Comm. Decision of 14 June 2007 Concerning Puerto Rico, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.109/2008/L.7 (June 2, 2008) (calling upon the United States to assume its 
responsibility to “expedite a process that will allow the Puerto Rican people to fully to 
exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence”); see also Press 
Release, U.N. Special Comm. on Decolonization Approves Text Calling on United States 
to Expedite Self-Determination Process for Puerto Rico, U.N. Doc. GA/COL/3193 
(June 15, 2009) (“The Special Committee on Decolonization this afternoon approved a 
draft resolution calling upon the Government of the United States to expedite a process 
that would allow the Puerto Rican people to exercise fully their inalienable right to self-
determination and independence.”). 
  
2010] RESOLVING PUERTO RICO’S POLITICAL STATUS 1069 
income taxes.111 In addition, the people of Puerto Rico enjoy 
representation in the international community. As a 
commonwealth, Puerto Rico can participate under its own flag in 
the Olympic Games112 and currently has a member on the 
International Olympic Committee.113 Puerto Rico also 
participates under its own flag in the Miss Universe pageant.114 
Puerto Rico’s international representation is such a source of 
pride among the people of Puerto Rico that the Popular 
Democratic Party, Puerto Rico’s pro-commonwealth party,115 has 
used the loss of Puerto Rico’s participation in the world Olympic 
Games and the Miss Universe Pageant as an argument against 
U.S. statehood.116 
 
111. See Arjun Garg, A Capital Idea: Legislation to Give the District of Columbia a Vote in 
the House of Representatives, 41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 51 n.14 (2007); Pedro A. 
Malavet, Reparations Theory and Postcolonial Puerto Rico: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 13 
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 387, 411 (2002); José D. Román, Trying to Fit an Oval Shaped 
Island Into a Square Constitution: Arguments for Puerto Rican Statehood, 29 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1681, 1695 (2002); Ediberto Román, The Citizenship Dialectic, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
557, 609 n.203 (2006). 
112. See Olympic.org, Puerto Rico, http://www.olympic.org/en/content/national-
olympic-committees/puerto-rico/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) (recognizing Puerto Rico as 
participating country since 1948); see also Declet, supra note 92, at 44 n.174 (“Puerto 
Rico is one of the few non-sovereign states which is permitted representation under its 
own flag at the Olympics . . . .”). 
113. See Olympic.org, Mr. Richard L. Carrion, http://www.olympic.org/en/
content/the-ioc/members/mr-richard-l-carrion/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) (listing 
Carrion as a member of the International Olympic Committee). 
114. See Miss Universe: Members, http://www.missuniverse.com/members/
contestants. In fact, since the first Miss Universe pageant held in 1952, Miss Universe 
About Us, http://www.missuniverse.com/info/history (last visited Mar. 2, 2010), Puerto 
Rico has won five titles, an achievement in which the people of Puerto Rico take a great 
deal of pride. See Miss Universe Titleholders, http://www.pageant.com/universe/
titleholders/index.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2010); see also David C. Indiano, The Top 10 
Myths About Puerto Rico Statehood, 52 FED. LAW. 8, 9 (2005) (“[P]articipation in the 
[world Olympic] games remains a great source of ‘national’ pride in Puerto Rico, as 
does participation in the Miss Universe contest, where Puerto Rico’s representatives 
have shined.”); Mike Williams, Puerto Rico Mulls Statehood, ATLANTA J. CONST., Dec. 23, 
2007, at A12 (describing how intensely proud Puerto Ricans are to have won five Miss 
Universe titles in the history of the pageant). 
115. See infra notes 140–43 (providing an overview of the Popular Democratic 
Party). 
116. See Manuel Perez-Rivas, The State Of Mind In Puerto Rico, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Nov. 
12, 1993, at 4 (“The opposition Popular Democratic Party, which favors keeping 
commonwealth status, has pointed out that statehood would mean no Puerto Rican flag 
at the Olympics and no Miss Puerto Rico to vie for the Miss Universe crown - the current 
Miss Universe is from Puerto Rico - in addition to other sources of cultural pride.”); 
Michael Remez, Winds of Change: Puerto Ricans Vote Sunday on the Island’s Future Status, 
HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 12, 1998, at A1 (“Opponents of statehood fear the island 
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The disadvantages that Puerto Rico’s commonwealth status 
imposes, however, appear to outweigh the advantages that the 
island’s status offers them. As previously noted, the people of 
Puerto Rico cannot vote for U.S. President,117 and only have a 
nonvoting resident commissioner to represent them in the U.S. 
House of Representatives.118 In addition, the people of Puerto 
Rico receive disproportionately low levels of aid under various 
federal programs.119 
The unequal treatment of the people of Puerto Rico under 
the U.S. Constitution derives from the territorial incorporation 
doctrine, or, as some have described it, the “unincorporation” 
doctrine.120 This doctrine derives from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
analysis of the Territorial Clause of the Constitution, which states 
that “Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all 
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other 
Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this 
Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of 
the United States, or of any particular State.”121  
The Supreme Court shaped the relationship between the 
United States and Puerto Rico through the territorial 
incorporation doctrine in a group of cases decided in the early 
 
would lose its Spanish language and culture, becoming dominated by American 
influences. Some lament the potential loss of Puerto Rico’s international identity: As a 
commonwealth, it can field its own Olympic teams, for example, or enter a contestant in 
the Miss Universe Pageant.”). 
117. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 126–27 and 
accompanying text (discussing Igartúa-De La Rosa v. United States in greater detail). 
118. See supra note 85 (referring to the Foraker Act, which established the position 
of Resident Commissioner in Puerto Rico); see also Ricardo Alfonso, The Imposition of the 
Death Penalty in Puerto Rico: A Human rights Crisis in the Path Towards Self-Determination, 76 
REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1077, 1092 (2007) (“The Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico, the 
Island’s only elected ‘representative’ in Congress, has the right to speak but not to vote 
on legislation before the House of Representatives.”). 
119. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (describing the lower levels of aid 
that the people of Puerto Rico receive under federal programs, such as Medicaid and 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families). 
120. See, e.g., Benjamin Madison, Trial by Jury or by Military Tribunal for Accused 
Terrorist Detainees Facing the Death Penalty? An Examination of the Principles that Transcend 
the U.S. Constitution, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 347, 428 (2006) (“The Insular Cases had 
spawned what was known as the ‘unincorporation’ doctrine.”); see also Charles R. 
Venator Santiago, Race, Space, and the Puerto Rican Citizenship, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 907, 
916 (2001) (focusing on “the doctrine of un-incorporation”). 
121. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
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twentieth century, known as the Insular Cases.122 In the seminal 
case of Downes v. Bidwell, the Supreme Court held that Puerto 
Rico “is a territory appurtenant and belonging to the United States, 
but not part of the United States within the revenue clauses of the 
Constitution.”123 Moreover, in Balzac v. Porto Rico, the Court held 
that the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury did not apply in 
Puerto Rico because the people of Puerto Rico did not have any 
constitutional rights absent Congress’ clear intent to incorporate 
the island into the United States.124 
Today, the territorial incorporation doctrine continues to 
justify the unequal treatment of the people of Puerto Rico. In 
Harris v. Rosario, for example, the Supreme Court held that the 
lower level of financial assistance that the people of Puerto Rico 
received under the former Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children program did not violate the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.125 Moreover, in Igartúa-De La Rosa v. United 
States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the 
denial of the people of Puerto Rico’s right to vote for U.S. 
president.126 In so doing, the court rejected the plaintiff’s 
arguments that: (1) residents of Puerto Rico have a constitutional 
right to vote for President as U.S. citizens; (2) the United States 
violates its obligations under the ICCPR, the Universal 
 
122. See Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality After 
Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 982–83 (2009) (“The Insular Cases, a series of 
Supreme Court decisions handed down between 1901 and 1922, have long been reviled 
as the cases that held that most of the Constitution does not ‘follow the flag’ outside the 
United States.”). But see PEDRO A. MALAVET, AMERICA’S COLONY: THE POLITICAL AND 
CULTURAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PUERTO RICO 38 (2004) (“Some 
scholars limit the label [of the Insular Cases] to only nine cases, which were resolved by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1901–02. Others take a broad view, identifying the insular 
cases as a more complex series that helped create the ‘American empire.’”). 
123. 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901) (emphasis added).  
124. 258 U.S. 298, 309 (1922) (“In Porto Rico, however, the Porto Rican can not 
insist upon the right of trial by jury, except as his own representatives in his legislature 
shall confer it on him. The citizen of the United States living in Porto Rico cannot there 
enjoy a right of trial by jury under the federal Constitution, any more than the Porto 
Rican. It is locality that is determinative of the application of the Constitution, in such 
matters as judicial procedure, and not the status of the people who live in it.”). 
125. 446 U.S. 651, 651–52 (1980) (holding that as long as it had a rational basis for 
its actions, Congress could treat Puerto Rico differently from U.S. states pursuant to the 
Territorial Clause of the Constitution and, in this case, Congress had a rational basis for 
treating Puerto Rico differently under the AFDC program). 
126. 417 F.3d 145, 146–47 (1st Cir. 2005) (rejecting Igartúa’s claim that he had a 
right to vote for U.S. President for the third time). 
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Declaration of Human Rights, and Inter-American Democratic 
Charter by denying the people of Puerto Rico of this right; and 
(3) there is a customary international law that requires the 
United States to grant them the right to vote in presidential 
elections.127  
The territorial incorporation doctrine has also contributed 
to the current problem of poverty in Puerto Rico.128 According to 
U.S. Census Bureau data from the 2006 Puerto Rico Community 
Survey, the median family income in Puerto Rico (US$20,425) is 
about a third that of the United States (US$58,526) and less than 
half that of Mississippi (US$42,805), which has the lowest median 
family income of any U.S. state.129 In addition, the individual 
poverty rate in Puerto Rico (45.4%) is also three times higher 
than the U.S. average and twice as high as any U.S. state.130 As 
 
127. Id. at 147–48, 150–51 (“Voting for President and Vice President of the United 
States is governed neither by rhetoric nor intuitive values but by a provision of the 
Constitution”; “[t]he treaties in question here do not adopt any legal obligations 
binding as a matter of domestic law,”; and “[n]o serious argument exists that customary 
international law, independent of the treaties now invoked, requires a particular form of 
representative government.”). The Honorable Juan Torruella, a native of Puerto Rico 
who sits on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and dissented in Igartúa-De La 
Rosa, contends that the United States, as a signatory to the ICCPR, has violated its 
obligations under the treaty regarding Puerto Ricans’ right to popular participation 
because the people of Puerto Rico cannot vote for President and have no voting 
representative in Congress. See Juan Torruella, The Insular Cases: The Establishment of a 
Regime of Political Apartheid, 77 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1, 41–42 (2008) (asserting that the 
United States “does not meet or comply with” its treaty obligations under the ICCPR for 
the above reasons). 
128. See Emilio Pantojas-Garca, The Puerto Rican Paradox: Colonialism Revisited, 40 
LATIN AM. RES. REV. 163 (2005) (“Underlying the reality of Puerto Rican poverty . . . are 
the ‘colonial status of the island and the second-class citizenship forced on its 
people . . . .’” (quoting SUSAN S. BAKER, UNDERSTANDING MAINLAND PUERTO RICAN 
POVERTY 203 (2002))); Puerto Rico Statehood Society, Statehood Issues, 
http://studentorgs.gwu.edu/prss/statehoodissues/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) (“[A]ny 
such poverty [in Puerto Rico] is the result of the current colonial status, where the U.S. 
citizens of Puerto Rico do not have equal rights in regards to benefits, rights, and 
responsibilities.”). 
129. See Press Release, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Puerto Rico has Higher 
Homeownership, Larger Households (Apr. 2, 2008), available at http://www.census.gov/
newsroom/releases/archives/american_community_survey_acs/cb08-cn55.html 
(providing statistics for Puerto Rico relative to the rest of the nation); see also Fed. 
Reserve Bank of N.Y., Communities in Focus: Puerto Rico, http://www.newyorkfed.org/
regional/community_puertorico.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) (“Puerto Rico’s per 
capita personal income in 2005 was $12,502. Per capita income for the rest of the nation 
was $34,586.”). 
130. See Press Release, U.S. Bureau of the Census, supra note 129 (“Since 2000, 
Puerto Rico’s individual poverty rate decreased from 48.2 percent to 45.4 percent. 
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these statistics suggest, the territorial incorporation doctrine has 
had real-life consequences for the people of Puerto Rico. 
Part I has provided an overview of the principle of self-
determination and Puerto Rico’s commonwealth status. This 
background provides the legal foundation and context necessary 
for a meaningful discussion of the exercise of self-determination 
in Puerto Rico. This Note now turns to Part II, which focuses on 
the political status debate in Puerto Rico and three issues that the 
exercise of self-determination in Puerto Rico raises. 
II. COMPETING VISIONS ON SELF-DETERMINATION IN 
PUERTO RICO 
The political status debate has dominated politics in Puerto 
Rico for many years.131 Accordingly, Part II begins by providing 
an overview of the political status debate in Puerto Rico. Part II.A 
provides an overview of the two main political parties in Puerto 
Rico, the pro-commonwealth Popular Democratic Party and the 
pro-statehood New Progressive Party. Part II.A also provides an 
overview of the 1967, 1993, and 1998 plebiscites held in Puerto 
Rico and the 1991 referendum. Part II.A ends with an overview of 
the President’s Task Force on Puerto Rico’s Status and the 
recommendation that the task force has made for a federally-
sanctioned plebiscite to be held in Puerto Rico. 
Through a presentation of two competing bills introduced 
in the 110th Congress,132 Part I.B focuses on three issues raised by 
the exercise of self-determination in Puerto Rico: (1) whether 
Congress or the people of Puerto Rico should initiate the final 
process of self-determination in Puerto Rico; (2) which status 
options should be presented to the people of Puerto Rico in a 
 
However, this rate was more than three times as high as the rate for the United States 
overall and more than twice as high as any state.”); see also Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 
supra note 129 (“About 45 percent of Puerto Rico’s residents live below the poverty 
threshold.”). 
131. See, e.g., Eduardo Jose Fernandez, Note, La Isla Del Escape: America’s Escape from 
Corporate Taxes & Puerto Rico’s Taxed Future, 19 FLA. J. INT’L L. 311, 315 (2007) (“Puerto 
Rican politics have revolved around Puerto Rico’s status and its relationship with the 
United States.”); Opinion, With OTEC, We Might Export Electricity, PACIFIC DAILY NEWS 
(Hagatna, Guam), Mar. 10, 2008, at A14 (“The political status issue so dominates Puerto 
Rico politics that the three main parties have nothing else on their agendas.”). 
132. See infra notes 190–92 (introducing House bills 900 and 1230 of the 110th 
Congress). 
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status plebiscite; and (3) whether mainland Puerto Ricans should 
be permitted to vote on Puerto Rico’s future political status.133 As 
Part II.B suggests, the political status debate in Puerto Rico raises 
complicated questions for which there are no clear answers.  
A. The Political Status Debate in Puerto Rico 
The people of Puerto Rico take island politics seriously. In 
terms of voter turnout, Puerto Rico ranks among the highest in 
the world.134 As one insider observed, “[t]he politics in Puerto 
Rico are intense—so intense that on election day over 85% of the 
electorate turn out to vote; a turnout rate not seen on the 
mainland.”135 Despite voting on the island’s status on a few 
occasions, the people of Puerto Rico still disagree strongly on the 
issue.136 The following subparts provide some explanation as to 
 
133. The exercise of self-determination in Puerto Rico raises additional questions, 
such as the U.S. attempt to Americanize the people of Puerto Rico through the 
imposition of the English language, which is beyond the scope of this Note. For an in-
depth discussion of this issue and the related issue of the role that the Spanish language 
plays in the cultural identity of the people of Puerto Rico, see José Julián Alvarez-
González, Law, Language & Statehood: The Role of English in the Great State of Puerto Rico, 
17 LAW & INEQ. 359 (1999). See also Arnold Leibowitz, The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico: 
Trying to Gain Dignity and Maintain Culture, 17 REV. JUR. U. INTER-AM. P.R. 1 (1982); 
Ángel R. Oquendo, Liking To Be in America: Puerto Rico’s Quest for Difference in the United 
States, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 250 (2004) [hereinafter Oquendo, Liking to Be in 
America]; Ángel R. Oquendo, Puerto Rican National Identity and United States Pluralism, in 
FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 315 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001) [hereinafter 
Oquendo, Puerto Rican National Identity]; Alicia Pousada, The Singularly Strange Story of the 
English Language in Puerto Rico, 3 MILENIO 33 (1999); Ediberto Román, Empire Forgotten: 
The United States’s Colonization of Puerto Rico, 42 VILL. L. REV. 1119, (1997). In addition, 
this Note does not address the U.S. political will to make Puerto Rico the 51st U.S. state 
should the people of Puerto Rico exercise their right to self-determination and choose 
the statehood status option. Although relevant, the political aspects surrounding Puerto 
Rican statehood are also beyond the scope of this Note. 
134. See Jeannette Rivera-Lyles, Puerto Ricans Gain Option of Going Green this Election, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 4, 2008, at A5 (“Puerto Rico has one of the highest voter 
turnouts in the hemisphere, with a minimum of eighty-two percent of the electorate 
regularly participating in elections.”); see also H. Hearing on H.R. 2499, supra note 14, at 
1 (opening statement of Nick J. Rahall, Chairman, H. Comm. on Natural Resources) 
(“Having some of the highest voter turnout rates in our Nation, Puerto Rico shames 
many of our own States with its energy and enthusiasm in electing its leaders.”). 
135. Maria Echaveste, Brown to Black: The Politics of Judicial Appointments for Latinos, 
13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 39, 41 n.4 (2002). 
136. See F.E. Guerra Pujol, Puerto Rico as a Critical Locality: Is a Post-Colonial Puerto 
Rico Possible? A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Impasse Over Puerto Rico’s Status, 20 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 561, 565 (2008) (“[T]he Puerto Rican electorate is closely divided 
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why the island’s political status remains in limbo, and, why, as 
Ángel Oquendo put it, there is a “profound tension in the soul of 
the Puerto Rican people.”137 
1. Major Political Parties in Puerto Rico: The PDP and the NPP 
Politics in Puerto Rico center on two groups, the pro-
commonwealth Popular Democratic Party (“PDP”) and the pro-
statehood New Progressive Party (“NPP”).138 A third party, the 
Puerto Rican Independence Party (“PIP”), enjoys little support 
in Puerto Rico.139 
PDP members and other pro-commonwealth supporters 
favor increased autonomy for Puerto Rico but wish to maintain 
ties with the United States.140 Some, for example, would like 
Puerto Rico to have “greater autonomy in domestic and external 
affairs, a demand for veto power over the United States laws 
applicable to the island and the full funding of federal programs, 
similar to the states, but without the corresponding obligation to 
pay federal income taxes.”141 The ideology of the PDP stems from 
 
between statehood and the status quo . . . .”); see also Burnett, supra note 93, at 871 
(stating that the political status debate has “deeply divided” the people of Puerto Rico). 
137. Oquendo, Liking To Be in America, supra note 133, at 250. 
138. See Frank E. Guerra, Comment on Bush vs. Gore and the Clems-Piazza Broken-Bat 
Incident, 39 REV. DER. P.R. 197, 222 n.8 (2000) (noting that the “two major political 
parties [in Puerto Rico] are the Popular Democratic Party (PDP), which favors Puerto 
Rico’s current ‘Commonwealth’ status, and the New Progressive Party (NPP), which 
favors statehood”); Fernandez, supra note 131, at 315 (stating that the PDP and the NPP 
“are the leading parties”). 
139. See Ingram, supra note 17, at 95 (“[T]here is very little support in Puerto Rico 
for independence.”); see also Guerra, supra note 138, at 222 n.8 (“Though it once was a 
formidable political party, today the Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP) has a 
negligible and paltry following at best.”). 
140. See Puerto Rico Governor Seeking Vote on Status, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1989, at 
A11 (“The Governor and his ruling Popular Democratic Party favor enlarging the 
commonwealth agreement to obtain the most autonomy while keeping Puerto Rico 
within the United States.”); see also Hermilla, supra note 19, at 284 n.27 (1998) 
(“Although the Popular Democratic Party (PDP) or the ‘Commonwealth’ party is 
generally characterized as supporting the status quo, the PDP has urged for a more 
expansive definition of commonwealth that goes way beyond the status quo . . . .”)). 
141. Hermilla, supra note 19, at 284 n.27; see also Román, supra note 133, at 1180–
81 (1997) (“The PDP favors an enhanced commonwealth status . . . . PDP supporters 
have long argued that [commonwealth] status ensures cultural identity while at the same 
time promoting economic stability without the obligation of federal taxes that faces 
citizens of the individual states.”); see Puerto Rico Seeks UN Help for Greater Autonomy, USA 
TODAY, Sep. 29, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-07-29-puerto-rico-
autonomy_n.htm (“Party officials say they want to maintain U.S. ties, but also to be able 
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the “best of both worlds” narrative promoted by Luis Muñoz 
Marin, Puerto Rico’s first democratically elected governor.142 
Muñoz Marin believed that “the United States-Puerto Rico 
commonwealth relationship could evolve to a ‘new kind of state 
. . . equal but different from statehood . . . sovereignty within 
sovereignty.’”143 
NPP members and other statehood proponents, on the 
other hand, favor full integration into the United States.144 The 
United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood (the “Council”) 
and the Center for Puerto Rico Equality and Advancement (the 
“Center”), for example, contend that statehood would afford the 
people of Puerto Rico equal civil and political rights under the 
Constitution.145 In addition, the Council contends that Puerto 
Rico would cease being a financial drain on the United States if it 
were to become a state, because statehood would strengthen the 
 
to negotiate trade pacts and import products carried on ships not registered in the 
United States, among other powers.”). 
142. See Oquendo, Puerto Rican National Identity, supra note 133, at 318–19 (noting 
that Luis Muñoz Marín founded the PDP in 1938 and that the PDP “conceived a 
political status which would give Puerto Ricans ‘the best of both worlds’: the cultural 
sovereignty benefits of independence and the economic stability of statehood”); Román, 
supra note 133, at 1184 (“Arguing that the people of Puerto Rico could have ‘the best of 
both worlds’ under the rubric of an enhanced commonwealth association with the 
United States, Muñoz Marin, considered the founder of the country, was the great 
proponent of the commonwealth status. As the first popularly elected Governor, Muñoz 
Marin acquired an unprecedented following in Puerto Rico.”). 
143. Román, supra note 133, at 1184 (quoting RAYMOND CARR, PUERTO RICO: A 
COLONIAL EXPERIMENT 73 (1984)). 
144. See Hermilla, supra note 19, at 284 n.27 (1998) (“The New Progressive Party 
. . . advocates statehood and wants to achieve its objectives for Puerto Rico within the 
Constitution by full integration into the United states as the 51st state with all rights and 
obligations, including the payment of federal taxes.”); see also The New Progressive Party 
Point of View, http://www.puertoricousa.com/english/pnp.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 
2010) (“The New Progressive Party, also known as the ‘Statehood’ party believes in full 
integration into the United States as the 51st state of the union.”). 
145. U.S. Council for Puerto Rico Statehood, Statehood Issues, 
http://www.prstatehood.com/issues/index.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) (stating that 
the United States “cannot continue to operate a colony, forcing U.S. citizens to accept a 
second-class citizenship, one without full political rights and equal representation, and 
not guaranteed by the constitution. The United States is a republic, not an empire.”); 
Ctr. for Puerto Rico Equality and Advancement, Our Principles, 
http://puertoricoadvancement.org/principles.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2009) (“The 
Center affirms that only through statehood can Puerto Rico attain the promise of equal 
citizenship and with it, both the inherent rights and responsibilities of American 
citizenship.”). 
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island’s economy.146 Thus, despite having to pay federal income 
taxes if the island were to become a state, the higher disposable 
income and economic growth that statehood would bring would 
more than offset this cost.147 
2. Plebiscites and Referenda Regarding Puerto Rico’s Political 
Status 
The government of Puerto Rico first organized a status 
plebiscite in 1967.148 Voters had the option of choosing between 
commonwealth, statehood, and independence.149 With 60.5% of 
the votes, the commonwealth option won the plebiscite.150 
Statehood and independence party members, however, 
purportedly boycotted the 1967 plebiscite,151 and interference by 
U.S. intelligence agencies may have tainted the plebiscite.152 The 
1967 plebiscite, therefore, may have been flawed. 
 
146. Council for Puerto Rico Statehood, supra note 145 (“Puerto Rico would no 
longer be a substantial cash drain on the U.S. economy. With statehood, the Puerto Rico 
economy will grow, become a source of additional revenue to the national treasury, and 
be less costly in support for the unemployed, the underemployed, and for disabled 
individuals who require public assistance.”); see also Karina Camacho, Note, The United 
States-Puerto Rico Relationship: Incomplete Decolonization, 48 HOW. L.J. 491, 511 (2004) 
(“[S]tatehooders believe that statehood would serve best to improve Puerto Rico’s 
economy.” (footnote omitted)). 
147. Council for Puerto Rico Statehood, supra note 145 (describing the economic 
benefits of U.S. statehood for Puerto Rico). 
148. See BEA & GARRETT, supra note 49, at 11 (“Following the recommendation of 
the Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico . . . the government of Puerto Rico 
organized a popular vote on the status options in July 1967.”); see also Hermilla, supra 
note 19, at 300 n.103 (noting that the 1967 plebiscite was the first one held in Puerto 
Rico). 
149. See BEA & GARRETT, supra note 49, at 29 (listing the ballot options for the 1967 
status plebiscite); see also KEITH BEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., POLITICAL STATUS OF 
PUERTO RICO: BACKGROUND, OPTIONS, AND ISSUES IN THE 109TH CONGRESS, CONGRESS 
RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 11 (2005) available at 
http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/ 67531/metacrs6708/m1/1/high_res_d/ (same). 
150. See BEA & GARRETT, supra note 49, at 29. 
151. BEA, supra note 149, at 10 (“Members of the independence and statehood 
party reportedly boycotted the plebiscite.”); Roman, supra note 108, at 112 (stating that 
the statehood and independence parties boycotted the 1967 plebiscite). 
152. See BEA, supra note 149, at 10 (“One political analyst contended that the 1967 
plebiscite ‘was tainted by blatant interference by United States intelligence agencies 
documented and denounced as ‘hanky-panky’ in a White House memorandum issued 
during the Carter presidency.” (quoting Juan M. Garcia Passalacqua, The 1993 Plebiscite 
in Puerto Rico: A First Step to Decolonization?, 93 CURRENT HIST. 103, 106 (1994))); 
Román, supra note 133, at 1162 (“[T]he PDP, which supported an enhanced 
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Twenty-four years later, the people of Puerto Rico voted in a 
referendum, which asked them to approve an amendment to be 
incorporated into Puerto Rico’s constitution.153 The 1991 
Referendum included proposals on “the right to determine the 
status of Puerto Rico without being subject to the plenary powers 
of Congress, guarantees of the continuance of Puerto Rico’s 
culture, . . . and a guarantee of U.S. citizenship based on 
constitutional, not statutory authority.”154 The PDP and PIP 
urged the people of Puerto Rico to vote “yes,” in support of their 
“Puerto Ricanness.”155 The NPP, by contrast, considered a “yes” 
vote as a rejection of their affiliation with the United States and 
therefore urged the people of Puerto Rico to vote “no” to the 
proposed amendment.156 Most voters (53.6%) voted against the 
amendment.157  
After the 1991 referendum, the people of Puerto Rico 
participated in two nonbinding plebiscites, one in 1993 and one 
in 1998.158 The Puerto Rican legislature authorized the 1993 
plebiscite after Congress failed to approve legislation regarding 
Puerto Rico’s political status.159 Voters were presented with the 
 
commonwealth status, obtained a majority after Puerto Rico’s two other political parties 
balked at U.S. involvement in the process and called for an abstention from voting.”). 
153. See BEA & GARRETT, supra note 49, at 11 (stating that voters in Puerto Rico 
were asked in a referendum “to vote on self-determination or rights that would be 
incorporated into the commonwealth constitution . . . .”); BEA, supra note 149, at 10 
(same). 
154. BEA & GARRETT, supra note 49, at 11–12. 
155. See BEA & GARRETT, supra note 49, at 12 (“Both the PDP and the PIP urged a 
‘yes’ vote.”); NANCY MORRIS, PUERTO RICO: CULTURE, POLITICS, AND IDENTITY 61 (1995) 
(“The message that referendum supporters were sending within the island was that a 
‘yes’ vote approving the referendum was a vote for ‘Puerto Ricanness.’”). 
156. See MORRIS, supra note 155, at 61 (noting that the NPP urged voters not to 
reject the proposed amendment); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUERTO RICO: 
CONFUSION OVER APPLICABILITY OF THE ELECTORAL LAW TO REFERENDUM PROCESS, 2, 
Rep. No. GAO-93-84 (1993), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat5/149253.pdf 
(stating that the NPP opposed the 1991 referendum and urged a “no” vote). 
157. See BEA & GARRETT, supra note 49, at 12, 29; BEA, supra note 149, at 11. 
158. See Torruella, supra note 127, at 42 n.194 (“There were plebiscites conducted 
in 1967, 1993, and 1998, but they were provided for by the local legislature and thus not 
binding on Congress.”); see also See DICK THORNBURGH, PUERTO RICO’S FUTURE: A TIME 
TO DECIDE, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES PRESS 20 (2007) 
(noting that the 1967, 1993, and 1998 plebiscites were conducted locally and without 
federal authorization). 
159. See BEA & GARRETT, supra note 49, at 12 & n.41. (“In the 1992 election 
campaign, the PNP candidate for governor urged, and the legislature agreed, that a 
plebiscite on status be held ‘after the U.S. Congress failed to approve’ status legislation.” 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-713, pt. 1, at 18 (1996)));BEA, supra note 149, at 9 (same). 
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status options of commonwealth, statehood, and 
independence.160 Neither the commonwealth nor the statehood 
option received a majority vote although the commonwealth 
option received a slightly higher percentage of votes than the 
statehood option did, 48.6% versus 46.4%, respectively.161 The 
independence option received only 4.4% of the votes.162 
Mainland Puerto Ricans also voted on the island’s political 
status in a parallel plebiscite that took place in New York City in 
October 1993.163 A group of mainland Puerto Ricans decided to 
organize the parallel plebiscite because the Puerto Rican 
legislature would not permit them to vote in the island 
plebiscite.164 Seventy voting machines were scattered throughout 
New York City in areas with significant Puerto Rican 
populations.165 Those born in Puerto Rico or with at least one 
parent born in the island were eligible to vote with proper 
documentation.166 Similarly to the 1993 island plebiscite, 
mainland Puerto Ricans were presented with the status options of 
statehood, commonwealth, and independence.167 The 
 
160. See BEA & GARRETT, supra note 49, at 29; BEA, supra note 149, at 11. 
161. See BEA & GARRETT, supra note 49, at 29; BEA, supra note 149, at 11. 
162. See BEA & GARRETT, supra note 49, at 29; BEA, supra note 149, at 11. 
163. See Declet, supra note 92, at 52 (stating the parallel plebiscite took place from 
October 7–9, 1993); Molly Gordy, Nuyoricans Get Eager, NEWSDAY (Melville, N.Y.), Oct. 7, 
1993, at 6 (noting that the balloting began on October 7, 1993). 
164. See Declet, supra note 92, at 51 (“Puerto Rican leaders in the United States 
organized their own ‘parallel plebiscite’ so that their voices would be heard along with 
those of their countrymen in Puerto Rico.”); David Gonzalez, Another Vote, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 7, 1993, at B3 (“It [the parallel plebiscite] was organized by a group of mainland 
Puerto Rican politicians and advocacy groups who were angered by their exclusion from 
the island’s Nov. 14 nonbinding plebiscite on Puerto Rico’s political status.”). 
165. See Gordy, supra note 163, at 6 (“The vote today, tomorrow and Saturday is 
certified by the city Board of Elections, which is providing 70 voting booths throughout 
the five boroughs.”). 
166. See Declet, supra note 92, at 53 (limiting voting to individuals born on the 
island or with “at least one Puerto Rican parent” and requiring voters to submit 
documentation or sign an affidavit affirming their Puerto Rican heritage)); Molly Gordy, 
No Say, But it Could Sway Nuyoricans Ready to Vote on P.R. Status, NEWSDAY (Melville, N.Y.), 
Oct. 4, 1993, at 14 (“Eligibility for the New York plebiscite [was] limited to those who 
[could] produce proof of Puerto Rican birth or parentage with documents, such as a 
birth certificate, passport, marriage license or military papers.”). 
167. See infra note 168 and accompanying text (describing the outcome of the 
parallel plebiscite based on these three status options). 
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commonwealth option won with 59% of the votes, 37% of the 
voters chose statehood, and 4% chose independence.168 
The last plebiscite that took place in Puerto Rico was in 
1998. Similarly to the 1993 plebiscite, Congress failed to approve 
legislation regarding Puerto Rico’s political status, prior to the 
1998 plebiscite.169 Unlike the 1993 plebiscite, however, voters 
were given five status options from which to choose: (1) Limited 
self-government (current commonwealth); (2) Free association; 
(3) Statehood; (4) Sovereignty (independence); and (5) None of 
the above.170 PDP members advocated the “none of the above” 
option because they favored an enhanced commonwealth status 
for Puerto Rico and disagreed with the use the federal 
government’s definition of Puerto Rico as a “territory” of the 
United States on the ballot for the current commonwealth 
option.171 The “none of the above” option received the majority 
of votes (50.3%) by a razor thin margin, and the statehood 
option followed closely with 46.6% of the votes.172 Less than 1% 
of voters chose the current commonwealth and free associations 
options, and the independence option received 2.6% of the votes 
in the 1998 plebiscite.173 
 
168. See Declet, supra note 92, at 53 (“The tally in New York City was 
Commonwealth, 59%, statehood, 37%, and independence, 4%.”); Molly Gordy, P.R. 
Statehood Losing, NEWSDAY (Melville, N.Y.), Oct. 14, 1993, at 40 (“Of the 10,101 votes cast 
by machine, 4 percent were cast for independence, 37 percent for statehood and 59 
percent for the status quo [the commonwealth option].”). 
169. See Román, supra note 133, at 1173–75 & nn.267–74 (comparing House bill 
856 with House bill 3024); see also THORNBURGH, supra note 158, at 20 (noting that the 
1998 plebiscite “was also without federal authorization”). 
170. See BEA & GARRETT, supra note 49, at 29; see also BEA, supra note 149, at 11. 
171. See THORNBURGH, supra note 158, at 20 (“Once Puerto Rico’s current 
‘commonwealth’ was presented on a ballot as defined by federal law (i.e., as a territory), 
rather than in the ‘enhanced’ form proposed by the local pro-commonwealth party, that 
option received less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the vote . . . .”); see also BEA & 
GARRETT, supra note 49, at 13 (“Commonwealth advocates, among others, reportedly 
urged a vote for ‘none of the above.’ They asserted that the commonwealth definition 
on the ballot ‘failed to recognize both the constitutional protections afforded to [their] 
U.S. citizenship and the fact that the relationship is based upon the mutual consent of 
Puerto Rico and the United States.’” (quoting DON YOUNG & GEORGE MILLER, THE 
RESULTS OF THE 1998 PUERTO RICO PLEBISCITE 20, SERIAL NO. 106-A (1999))). 
172. See BEA & GARRETT, supra note 49, at 13, 29 (identifying the percentage of 
votes received under the “none of the above” and statehood options in the 1998 status 
plebiscite); see also BEA, supra note 149, at 11 (same). 
173. See BEA & GARRETT, supra note 49, at 29 (identifying the percentage of votes 
received under the current commonwealth, free association, and independence options 
in the 1998 status plebiscite); see also BEA, supra note 149, at 11 (same). 
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Today, the people of Puerto Rico remain divided on the 
status options of U.S. statehood and enhanced commonwealth.174 
Recent polls suggest that the political tide appears to be turning 
in favor of statehood supporters,175 as evidenced by the 2008 
gubernatorial election held in Puerto Rico where the winner, 
former Resident Commissioner Luis Fortuño, is a member of the 
pro-statehood NNP, in addition to the current Resident 
Commissioner, Pedro Pierluisi, who ran with Fortuño.176 The 
2008 gubernatorial race in Puerto Rico represented a major 
victory for the NPP.177  
3. The Recommendation of the President’s Task Force on 
Puerto Rico’s Status 
In December 2000, President Clinton signed Executive 
Order 13,183, establishing the President’s Task Force on Puerto 
Rico’s Status (“President’s Task Force” or “Task Force”).178 The 
purpose of the Task Force “is to provide options for Puerto 
 
174. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (recognizing the disagreement 
among the people of Puerto Rico regarding the island’s future political status). 
175. See U.S. Council for Puerto Rico Statehood, New Poll: Statehood Favored by Large 
Majority in Puerto Rico (July 14, 2008), available at http://www.prstatehood.com/news/
poll_071408.pdf (citing a 2008 poll conducted by the Kaagan Research Associates of 
New York that showed 57% of the people of Puerto Rico want U.S. statehood and only 
34% prefer the status quo); Frances Ruan, Poll: Statehood Gains Ground as Status 
Preference, CARIBBEAN BUSINESS (Puerto Rico), July 9, 2009, 
http://www.caribbeanbusinesspr.com/news02.php?nw_id=1796&ct_id=26 (citing a 2009 
poll conducted by Gaither International that indicated that commonwealth support fell 
to below 40% while support for statehood increased to 51%); see also infra note 176 and 
accompanying text (describing the NPP victory in the gubernatorial and Resident 
Commissioner races in November 2008).  
176. Frances Robles, Embattled Puerto Rico Governor Soundly Defeated, MIAMI HERALD, 
Nov. 5, 2008, at A12 (describing Fortuño’s victory over Aníbal Acevedo Vilá (misspelling 
of name in article) who was facing charges of campaign finance fraud at the time of the 
2008 gubernatorial election); see also New Governor Elected, CARIBBEAN UPDATE (Millburn, 
N.J.), Dec. 1, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 25866707 (“Born in 1960, [Luis Fortuño 
was] Puerto Rico’s Resident Commissioner in the US Congress, and ran in a fourway 
gubernatorial race representing the pro-statehood NPP. His running-mate Pedro 
Pierluisi also won the Resident Commissioner race, becoming the island’s next 
representative in Congress.”). 
177. See New Governor Elected, supra note 176 (“Luis Fortuno on Nov. 4 gave the 
New Progressive Party (NPP) its biggest victory in the party’s 40-year history.”); Damien 
Cave, Puerto Rico Governor Promises Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2008, at A28 (noting 
that Fortuño won by “about 220,000 votes, one of the widest margins in decades . . . .”). 
178. EXEC. ORDER NO. 13183, 65 FED. REG. 82889 (Dec. 23, 2000) (establishing the 
Task Force). 
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Rico’s future status and relationship with the Government of the 
United States.”179  
The President’s Task Force has published two reports since 
its inception, one in December 2005 and one in December 
2007.180 Until recently, the Task Force’s next report was due in 
December 2009.181 On October 30, 2009, however, President 
Obama signed an Executive Order extending the deadline for 
the Task Force to submit its next report to the President no later 
than one year from the order’s date.182  The executive order also 
broadened the Task Force’s mission to include economic 
development matters in Puerto Rico.183  
In its 2005 report, the Task Force stated the U.S. 
Constitution recognizes U.S. statehood and independence as the 
only two non-territorial options between the United States and 
Puerto Rico.184 Based on this premise, the Task Force 
recommended a federally-sanctioned plebiscite that first asks the 
 
179. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON PUERTO RICO’S STATUS, REPORT BY THE 
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON PUERTO RICO’S STATUS 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/2007-report-by-the-president-task-force-on-
puerto-rico-status.pdf [hereinafter 2007 TASK FORCE REPORT]. 
180. See id. (quoting from the 2007 Task Force report); infra note 184 (referring to 
the 2005 Task Force report). 
181. See Exec. Order No. 13,319, 68 Fed. Reg. 68233 (Dec. 3, 2003) (instructing the 
Task Force to issue reports at least once every two years).  
182. See Exec. Order No. 13,517, 74 Fed. Reg. 57239 (Oct. 30, 2009) (stating that 
the Task Force “shall submit to the President a report on the actions it has taken . . . no 
later than 1 year from the date of this order”). 
183. See id. (amending section 1 of Executive Order 13183 to include the following 
sentence: “It is also the policy of the executive branch to improve the treatment of 
Puerto Rico in Federal programs and to promote job creation, education, health care, 
clean energy, and economic development on the islands.”); see also Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, The President’s Task Force on Puerto Rico’s Status Holds First Meeting 
(Dec. 15, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/December/09-asg-
1343.html (noting that President Obama signed an Executive Order on October 30, 
2009, expanding the Task Force’s “focus to include matters affecting Puerto Rico’s 
economic development”). 
184. See PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON PUERTO RICO’S STATUS, REPORT BY THE 
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON PUERTO RICO’S STATUS 10 (2005), available at 
http://puertoricoadvancement.org/Documents/presidential task force report on 
puerto rico -december2005.pdf [hereinafter 2005 TASK FORCE REPORT] (“Although the 
current territorial status may continue so long as Congress desires, there are only two 
non-territorial options recognized by the U.S. Constitution that establish a permanent 
status between the people of Puerto Rico and the Government of the United States. One 
is statehood. Under this option, Puerto Rico would become the 51st State with standing 
equal to the other 50 States. The other is independence. Under this option, Puerto Rico 
would become a separate, independent sovereign nation.”). 
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people of Puerto Rico “whether they wish to remain a U.S. 
territory subject to the will of Congress or to pursue a 
constitutionally viable path toward a permanent non-territorial 
status with the United States.”185 “If the people of Puerto Rico 
elect to pursue a permanent non-territorial status,” the second 
step requires “Congress [to] provide for an additional plebiscite 
allowing the people of Puerto Rico to choose between one of the 
two permanent non-territorial options.”186 The 2007 Task Force 
report reiterated its prior recommendation for a federally-
sanctioned plebiscite to be held in Puerto Rico but left open 
“alternative action by Puerto Rico itself to express its views to 
congress.”187 
B. Three Issues that Resolving Puerto Rico’s Political Status Raises 
Since 2006, several bills regarding Puerto Rico’s status have 
been introduced in Congress.188 One bill, H.R. 2499, the Puerto 
Rico Democracy Act of 2009, is currently pending in Congress.189 
This Note focuses on H.R. 900, the Puerto Rico Democracy Act 
of 2007 (“Democracy Act”),190 which was amended on April 22, 
2008,191 and on H.R. 1230, the Puerto Rico Self-Determination 
Act of 2007 (“Self-Determination Act”).192 Even though these 
bills died, the issues that they raise provide a useful springboard 
from which to analyze how the process of self-determination 
should proceed in Puerto Rico. 
 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. 2007 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 179, at 10. 
188. See Puerto Rico Democracy Act of 2007, S. 1936, 110th Cong. (2007); Puerto 
Rico Democracy Act of 2006, H.R. 4867, 109th Cong. (2006); Puerto Rico Democracy 
Act of 2006, S. 2661, 109th Cong. (2006); Puerto Rico Self-Determination Act of 2006, 
H.R. 4963, 109th Cong. (2006); Puerto Rico Self-Determination Act of 2006, S. 2304, 
109th Cong. (2006).  
189. Puerto Rico Democracy Act of 2009, H.R. 2499, 111th Cong. (2009) 
(providing for the people of Puerto Rico a federally-sanctioned self-determination 
process). 
190. H.R. 900, 110th Cong. (2007) (providing for the people of Puerto Rico a 
federally-sanctioned self-determination process). 
191. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-597 (2008) (recommending that House bill 900 as 
amended pass the House of Representatives). 
192. H.R. 1230, 110th Cong. (2007) (“[R]ecogniz[ing] the right of the People of 
Puerto Rico to call a Constitutional Convention through which the people would 
exercise their natural right to self-determination” and “establish[ing] a mechanism for 
congressional consideration of such decision . . . .”). 
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1. Who Should Initiate the Process 
A threshold question that arises in the context of self-
determination in Puerto Rico is whether the United States or 
Puerto Rico should initiate the process. If adopted by Congress, 
the Democracy Act would have established a federally-sanctioned 
plebiscite where residents of Puerto Rico would first vote on 
whether “Puerto Rico should continue to have its present form of 
territorial status and relationship with the United States” or 
whether “Puerto Rico should pursue a constitutionally viable 
permanent non-territorial status.”193 In other words, step one of 
this process would have asked the people of Puerto Rico whether 
they would like to maintain the island’s commonwealth status or 
whether they want change. 
The Democracy Act proposed that a plebiscite be conducted 
no later than December 31, 2009.194 If a majority voted for 
change, Congress would have recognized the people of Puerto 
Rico’s inherent authority to  
call a Constitutional Convention . . . for the purpose of 
proposing to the People of Puerto Rico a self-determination 
option which, if approved by the People of Puerto in a 
referendum, would be presented to Congress . . . or conduct 
a plebiscite administered by the Puerto Rico State Elections 
Commission to consider a self-determination option with the 
results presented to Congress.195 
The Self-Determination Act would have called a single 
constitutional convention “for the purpose of proposing to the 
People of Puerto Rico a Self-Determination Option, which if 
approved by the People of Puerto Rico in a referendum would be 
presented to Congress by the Constitutional Convention as a Self-
Determination Proposal.”196 If approved by the people of Puerto 
Rico, the Self-Determination Proposal would have been 
presented to Congress.197 If neither the people of Puerto Rico 
 
193. H.R. REP. NO. 110-597, at 1. 
194. See H.R. 900 § 3(a) (“The Puerto Rico State Elections Commission shall 
conduct a plebiscite in Puerto Rico during the 111th Congress, but not later than 
December 31, 2009.”). 
195. H.R. REP. NO. 110-597, at 1–2. 
196. H.R. 1230 § 3. 
197. See id. (“Congress recognizes the inherent authority of the People of Puerto 
Rico to call a Constitutional Convention, constituted by a number of delegates to be 
determined in accordance to legislation approved by the Commonwealth of Puerto 
  
2010] RESOLVING PUERTO RICO’S POLITICAL STATUS 1085 
nor Congress approved the proposal, the constitutional 
convention would reconvene to formulate another self-
determination option to present to the people of Puerto Rico 
and Congress.198 
The Democracy Act and Self-Determination Act represent 
two competing theories on how the final process of self-
determination in Puerto Rico should proceed. The Democracy 
Act reflects the view that Congress should take the critical first 
step toward implementing a process of self-determination for the 
people of Puerto Rico.199 Those, such as Dick Thornburgh, 
former U.S. Attorney General and governor of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,200 who support a definitive 
resolution of Puerto Rico’s political status have stressed the need 
for Congress to pass legislation authorizing a plebiscite.201 
According to Thornburgh, for example, “[a]ny plebiscite by 
voters in Puerto Rico among locally formulated status alternatives 
that might or might not assure their transition to full self-
government is inconclusive and potentially disruptive unless the 
alternatives presented to the voters have previously been 
approved by Congress . . . .”202 
 
Rico, for the purpose of proposing to the People of Puerto Rico a Self-Determination 
Option, which if approved by the People of Puerto Rico in a referendum would be 
presented to Congress by the Constitutional Convention as a Self-Determination 
Proposal.”). 
198. Id. § 4(a)(1)–(2) (describing the approval or rejection process of the self-
determination proposal). 
199. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 900 and H.R. 1230 Before the Subcomm. on Insular 
Affairs of the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 110th Cong. 47 (2007) [hereinafter H. 
Hearing on H.R. 900 and H.R. 1230] (statement of Thomas C. Goldstein, Partner, Akin 
Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP) (“[T]he power to resolve the political status of 
Puerto Rico is vested exclusively in Congress and the local constitutional process must 
operate within any framework created by Congress.”); see also Pedro A. Malavet, Puerto 
Rico: Cultural Nation, American Colony, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 103 (2000) (“It is the 
constitutional obligation of the United States Congress to decide whether or not Puerto 
Rico should become a post-colonial state.”). 
200. See THORNBURGH, supra note 158, at 103 (providing information about Dick 
Thornburgh); see also Citizens Want Political Status Defined, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jun. 14, 
2007, at 19A (“Dick Thornburgh is a former governor of Pennsylvania and a former U.S. 
attorney general.”). 
201. See THORNBURGH, supra note 158, at 86 (“History teaches us that Congress 
must take the initiative in framing the terms for resolution of Puerto Rico’s political 
status.”); see also H. Hearing on H.R. 2499, supra note 14, at 65 (statement of Thomas 
Rivera-Schatz, President, S. of Puerto Rico) (asking Congress “to succeed where more 
than 50 previous Congresses have failed” by passing House bill 2499). 
202. THORNBURGH, supra note 158, at 18. 
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By contrast, the Self-Determination Act reflects the position 
that the initial process of self-determination in Puerto Rico 
should come from the people of Puerto Rico.203 In accordance 
with the compact theory,204 the Self-Determination Act states that 
“[a] Self-Determination Option must be based on the sovereignty 
of the People of Puerto Rico and not subject to the plenary 
powers of the territorial clause of the Constitution of the United 
States.”205 Thus, the Self-Determination Act sought to have the 
people of Puerto Rico initiate the process of self-determination 
through a constitutional convention.206 
2. Which Status Options to Include 
A second question that arises in the context of self-
determination in Puerto Rico is whether a “new or modified 
commonwealth” status should be included on a ballot. Following 
the recommendation of the President’s Task Force, the 
Democracy Act introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives 
stated that the people of Puerto Rico would be able to choose 
between the options of statehood or independence if they voted 
for change in the initial plebiscite.207 Under the statehood 
option, “Puerto Rico [would have been] admitted as a State of 
the Union, on equal footing with the other States . . . .”208 The 
independence option would have allowed “Puerto Rico [to] 
become a sovereign nation, either fully independent from or in 
free association with the United States under an international 
agreement that preserves the right of each nation to terminate 
the association . . . .”209 
 
203. See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional 
convention proposed in House bill 1230). 
204. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text (describing the compact theory 
based after Public Law 600 was passed). 
205. H.R. 1230, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007). 
206. See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional 
convention proposed in House bill 1230). 
207. H.R. 900, 110th Cong. § 3(c) (2007) (describing the procedure if a majority of 
voters in the initial plebiscite favored pursuing a permanent nonterritorial status for 
Puerto Rico). 
208. Id. § 3(c)(1). 
209. Id. § 3(c)(2). The amended version of the Democracy Act stated that Congress 
recognized the right of the people of Puerto Rico to call a constitutional convention or 
another plebiscite if voters chose to pursue a constitutionally-viable permanent 
nonterritorial status for Puerto Rico. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-597, at 3 (2008) (declining to 
set forth specific status options). As previously noted, however, statehood and 
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The Self-Determination Act, on the other hand, recognized 
a “new or modified commonwealth” as a status option in 
addition to U.S. statehood and independence.210 The Self-
Determination Act did not explain what this status option would 
mean for Puerto Rico. One could, however, envision a variety of 
forms a “new or modified commonwealth” status could take. A 
“new or modified commonwealth” could, for example, enhance 
the civil and political rights of the people of Puerto Rico by 
allowing them to vote for President or gain voting power in 
Congress.211 In addition, it could expand Puerto Rico’s autonomy 
by allowing the island to trade and enter into treaties with 
foreign nations.212 
Not surprisingly, pro-statehood and pro-commonwealth 
supporters disagree on which status options should be presented 
to the people of Puerto Rico. The NPP and their supporters 
favored the Democracy Act because they believe that including a 
“new or modified commonwealth” status option avoids the hard 
choice that the people of Puerto Rico ultimately need to make 
between U.S. statehood and independence.213 The current 
commonwealth status, in their view, is a discriminatory status that 
promotes the second-class treatment of the people of Puerto 
Rico.214 
 
independence are the only nonterritorial options that the Constitution recognizes 
according to the President’s Task Force. See 2005 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra notes 185–
86 and accompanying text (describing the Task Force’s two-step proposal regarding 
Puerto Rico’s political status). The amended version of the Democracy Act, therefore, 
did not substantively differ from the bill introduced in the House of Representatives. 
210. H.R. 1230, 110th Cong. § 2(2) (2007) (proposing that a “new or modified 
commonwealth” status be presented to the people of Puerto Rico). 
211. See supra Part I.B.3 (describing the unequal treatment of the people of Puerto 
Rico). 
212. See supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the 
PDP). 
213. See THORNBURGH, supra note 158, at 86–87 (“Members of Congress (and 
certain political leaders in Puerto Rico) should stop pretending that some ‘enhanced 
commonwealth’ status would avoid hard choices between statehood and 
independence.”); see also H. Hearing on H.R. 900 and H.R. 1230, supra note 199, at 198–
99 (statement of Jose F. Aponte-Hernandez, Speaker, H.R. of Puerto Rico) (“[I]n order 
to conclude the long overdue problem of Puerto Rico’s self- determination, [Congress] 
must make certain that the status options provided in any referendum to the US citizens 
who reside in Puerto Rico be limited to those that are constitutional viable, non-
territorial, non-colonial and fully democratic in nature. In other words, they must be 
limited to options that guarantee full self-government by the people of Puerto Rico.”). 
214. See THORNBURGH, supra note 158, at 87 (“A ‘commonwealth’ is simply a form 
of nonpermanent territorial status that implements limited self-government at the 
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Critics of the Democracy Act, such as former Governor of 
Puerto Rico, Aníbal Acevedo-Vilá, suggested that it was biased 
toward U.S. statehood and called for a process that would have 
distorted the will of the people of Puerto Rico.215 They emphasize 
the importance of maintaining a flexible arrangement between 
the United States and Puerto Rico.216 From their perspective, the 
Self-Determination Act “[was] not slanted against or for any 
political status option” because it “offer[ed] a fair, democratic 
and inclusive means for the people of Puerto Rico to express 
their voice and exercise their right of self-determination.”217 
3. Who Gets to Vote 
A third question that arises in the context of self-
determination in Puerto Rico is whether mainland Puerto Ricans 
should be permitted to vote on the island’s political future. The 
Democracy Act would have permitted mainland Puerto Ricans 
born in Puerto Rico to vote in a status plebiscite in addition to 
 
discretion of Congress and leaves territorial residents subject to the unchecked power of 
a Congress in which they have no voting representatives.”); see also Ctr. for Puerto Rico 
Equality and Advancement Mission Statement, http://puertoricoadvancement.org/
mission.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2009) (“[T]he end of the island’s current 
disenfranchised, dysfunctional territorial status is in the best interests of both the people 
of Puerto Rico and our fellow citizens on the mainland U.S.”). 
215. See H. Hearing on H.R. 900 and H.R. 1230, supra note 199, at 166 (statement of 
Aníbal Acevedo-Vilá, Governor of Puerto Rico) (“Now, the same people who could not 
convince the citizens of the Island to vote for statehood, are trying—again—to change 
the rules of the game, crafting a system to force statehood upon Puerto Rico [in H.R. 
900]. Rather than give every Puerto Rican an equal opportunity to have his or her voice 
heard, these statehood advocates have designed a series of referendums that would 
distort the will of the people.”). 
216. See José R. Coleman Tió, Democracy, Not Statehood: The Case for Puerto Rican 
Congressmen, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 397, 399 (2007) (“Because Puerto Ricans 
support a relationship that both assures a strong union with the United States and also 
maintains local power over local affairs, commentators and legislators are wrong to 
reject flexible arrangements and to insist only on independence or statehood. By 
insisting on those two arrangements, commentators disparage Puerto Ricans’ own 
democratic decisions and perhaps even imply that Puerto Ricans are ignorant of their 
own best interests.”); see also Camacho, supra note 146, at 492–93 (expressing support 
for an enhanced commonwealth status). 
217. See PRFAA, Press Release, Puerto Rico Self-Determination Act of 2007 
(H.R.1230) (2007) (on file with author) (“Unlike other initiatives past and present, the 
‘Puerto Rico Self-Determination Act of 2007’ is not slanted against or for any particular 
political status option. The bill offers a fair, democratic and inclusive means for the 
people of Puerto Rico to express their voice and exercise their right of self-
determination.”). 
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the people of Puerto Rico.218 The Self-Determination Act would 
have extended voting eligibility to mainland Puerto Ricans with 
at least one parent born in Puerto Rico.219 The fact that the 
stateside Puerto Rican population now exceeds that of the island 
may offer some explanation for this general agreement.220 
According to a 2007 report by the North American Congress on 
Latin America, leaders in Puerto Rico have increasingly turned to 
mainland Puerto Ricans for support on island issues since the 
1990s as a result of the Puerto Rican diaspora.221 
Advocates have asserted several arguments in favor of 
granting mainland Puerto Ricans the right to vote in a status 
plebiscite. Many mainland Puerto Ricans, they claim, take a great 
deal of pride in being Puerto Rican and care about the island’s 
political status, which intertwines with their identity.222 In 
 
218. H.R. 900, 110th Cong. § 3(c)(1)–(2) (2007) (indicating that “[a]ll eligible 
voters under the electoral laws in effect in Puerto Rico,” and “[a]ll United States citizens 
born in Puerto Rico who comply, to the satisfaction of the Puerto Rico State Elections 
Commissions, with all Puerto Rico State Elections Commission requirements (other 
than the residency requirement)” would have been permitted to vote in a plebiscite 
conducted under H.R. 900); see also Jorge Duany, The Puerto Rican Diaspora to the United 
States: A Postcolonial Migration? 25 (Nov. 7, 2008) (unpublished paper), available at  
http://www.centropr.org/documents/events/jorge_duany_puerto_rican_diaspora.pdf 
(“The Puerto Rico Democracy Act of 2007 (H.R. 900), a bill sponsored by Serrano and 
Fortuño, would extend the right to vote to US residents born on the Island.”). 
219. H.R. 1230, 110th Cong. § 2(4)–(5) (2007) (defining the people of Puerto Rico 
as “residents in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and non-resident Puerto Ricans” and 
non-resident Puerto Ricans as “individuals who are not legal residents of the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and who are either born in Puerto Rico or have one 
parent born in Puerto Rico”). 
220. See, e.g., Angelo Falcón, The Diaspora Factor: Stateside Boriquas and the Future of 
Puerto Rico, 40(6) NACLA REP. ON THE AMS., Nov.–Dec. 2007, at 29 (“According to the 
latest U.S. Census estimates, in 2005 there were about 3,780,000 Puerto Ricans living in 
the States compared to about 3,670,000 in Puerto Rico.”). The mainland Puerto Rican 
population continues to slightly outnumber that of the island. Compare U.S. Bureau of 
the Census, 2008 American Community Survey for those of Hispanic/Latino Origin, 
available at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DTTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=01000US&-
ds_name=ACS_2008_1YR_G00_&-_lang=en&-mt_name=
ACS_2008_1YR_G2000_B03001&-format=&-context=dt (estimating a U.S Puerto Rican 
population of 4,216,533), with CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 47, at 552 
(estimating an island population of 3,971,020 as of July 2009). 
221. See Falcón, supra note 220, at 29 (explaining that it wasn’t until the 1990s that 
the relationship between the stateside and island communities “took on an increasingly 
political nature . . . [because it] was then that the stateside Puerto Rican community 
increased its representation in the U.S. House of Representatives from one to three—
two from New York and one from Chicago, all Democrats”). 
222. See Christine MacDonald, Statehood Issue Divides Area’s Puerto Ricans, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Mar. 15, 1998, at 1 (“Martinez said she cares about the island’s political fate 
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addition, most have families who live there.223 Advocates, such as 
Rafael Declet, have also invoked the doctrine of jus sanguinins for 
the proposition that Puerto Rican nationality extends to all 
persons of Puerto Rican descent, including those residing in the 
mainland.224 Finally, advocates contend that the people of Puerto 
Rico do not cease being Puerto Rican just because they migrated 
to the United States.225  
Several arguments, however, have been made against 
allowing mainland Puerto Ricans to vote on the island’s political 
future in the past. According to opponents, identifying and 
registering eligible voters throughout the states and abroad 
would present logistical difficulties.226 Opponents have also 
argued that it is unfair to permit mainland Puerto Ricans to vote 
on Puerto Rico’s status when the outcome of a vote on the future 
 
because it intertwines with her identity.” (quoting Lisa Martinez, a Puerto Rican who was 
born and raised in the United States)); see also Raymond Hernandez, New York Vote Plan 
Seeks to Gain Voice In Puerto Rico Status, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1993, at A1 (“Once you raise 
the question of a plebiscite, you have to include all people of Puerto Rican descent . . . . 
We have very close ties to the island.” (quoting former City Councilman Jose Rivera of 
the Bronx)). 
223. See Tamara Lytle & Jeannette Rivera-Lyles, Governor: Let Off-Islanders Vote on 
Puerto Rico, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 28, 2007, at A4 (“Allowing Puerto Ricans living 
outside the island . . . to participate is only fair . . . . We [islanders] all have a relative 
who lives in the mainland, and we all know that relative calls himself Puerto Rican.” 
(quoting former Puerto Rico Governor Aníbal Acevedo-Vilá)); Mireya Navarro, U.S. 
Puerto Ricans Debate Right to Vote on Island’s Future, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1990, at B1 
(“Many Puerto Ricans who came to the United States note that they own property in 
Puerto Rico and most of their families remain there.”). 
224. Declet, supra note 92, at 46 (claiming that because Puerto Rico has remained 
a civil law jurisdiction since the 16th century, the doctrine of jus sanguinis governs 
Puerto Rican nationality). 
225. See Navarro, supra note 223 (“Just because we left we don’t stop being Puerto 
Rican . . . . We shouldn’t be denied the right to vote.” (quoting Reinaldo Pacheco, a 
native of Puerto Rico who migrated to New York City)); see also Hernandez, supra note 
222 (“Puerto Rico is still my country. I wish I was there now.” (quoting Angel Allalo who 
left the island for economic reasons)). 
226. See Miriam Ramirez de Ferrer, No Way, José (Serrano)! Only Residents of Puerto 
Rico Should be Entitled to Vote in the 1998 Plebiscite, PUERTO RICO HERALD, July 31, 1997, 
http://www.puertorico-herald.org/issues/970731/top-story-970731.html (“Who 
qualifies as a Puerto Rican? How do you go about registering 1 million voters scattered 
throughout the 50 states, not to mention those Puerto Ricans who live abroad? When do 
they vote, and where? Who’s going to print the ballots, hold the election and pay the 
costs?”); see also Hernandez, supra note 222 (“Gov. Pedro J. Rossello and his pro-
statehood New Progressive Party rejected any formal participation in the vote from 
people on the mainland because of what he described as logistical problems.”). 
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status of Puerto Rico will not directly affect them.227 Finally, 
opponents have asserted that mainland Puerto Ricans have 
“already voted against the status quo with their feet.”228  
III. RESOLVING PUERTO RICO’S POLITICAL STATUS 
Puerto Rico’s commonwealth status has created a world of 
confusion. Torn between their cultural identity and desire for 
stronger ties with the United States, the people of Puerto Rico 
disagree on which status option would best serve them in the 
future.229 On the other hand, the people of Puerto Rico are tired 
of the status quo.230 Even though the United Nations continues 
to call upon the United States to facilitate the process of self-
determination in Puerto Rico, Congress has yet to take action.231 
Moreover, aside from recommending a federally-sanctioned 
plebiscite regarding Puerto Rico’s political status in 2005,232 the 
President’s Task Force has done little to help resolve the island’s 
political status. 
Part III of this Note focuses on the resolution of Puerto 
Rico’s political status. Part III.A explains why the island’s political 
status needs to be resolved. Part III.B explains how the process of 
self-determination should proceed in Puerto Rico based on the 
issues of: (1) whether Congress or the people of Puerto Rico 
 
227. See Ramirez de Ferrer, supra note 226 (“Since mainland Puerto Ricans will 
continue to enjoy all the benefits of their current residency, it would be the height of 
hypocrisy for them to foist on the Puerto Ricans left behind, a political status that they 
themselves will neither be subject to (unless statehood if chosen) nor restricted by (if 
independence or the status quo win out.”)); Ediberto Román, The Alien-Citizen Paradox 
and Other Consequences of U.S. Colonialism, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 47 n.282 (1998) 
(“While I object in the most strongest terms to the colonial status for Puerto Rico, as a 
resident of the mainland who will not be as directly affected as the resident’s [sic] of the 
territory by any ultimate decision on its status, I do not believe it is my place to impart 
my view on the preferred legitimate status option-statehood or independence.”). 
228. Ramirez de Ferrer, supra note 226. 
229. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (describing the “profound tension” 
within the soul of Puerto Ricans); see also supra note 136 and accompanying text (noting 
the disagreement among the people of Puerto Rico regarding the U.S. statehood and 
enhanced commonwealth status options). 
230. See, e.g., supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text (describing the 1998 
plebiscite where the current commonwealth option received less than 1% of the vote 
and the majority of voters chose the “none of the above” status option). 
231. See supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text (discussing the U.N.’s 
monitoring efforts of Puerto Rico in recent years). 
232. See supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text (describing the Task Force’s 
recommendation for a federally-sanctioned plebiscite to be held in Puerto Rico). 
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should initiate the process of self-determination in Puerto Rico; 
(2) which status options should be presented to the people of 
Puerto Rico; and (3) whether Mainland Puerto Ricans should be 
permitted to vote on Puerto Rico’s future political status. 
A. Why Puerto Rico’s Political Status Needs to Be Resolved 
Puerto Rico’s political status is unsatisfactory and therefore 
needs to be resolved. From a classification perspective, the 
island’s political status is extremely problematic. Puerto Rico’s 
commonwealth status, for example, does not fit into any of the 
status options that Resolution 1541 identifies.233 The island is not 
an independent state, in free association with the United States, 
and Puerto Rico has not been integrated into the United States 
as a state.234 In addition, neither the United States nor the U.N. 
Decolonization Committee appears to recognize Puerto Rico as a 
“political status freely determined by the people” within the 
meaning of Resolution 2625.235  
Whether Puerto Rico qualifies as a case of internal or 
external self-determination is also unclear.236 Prior to its 
establishment as a commonwealth, Puerto Rico was a U.S. 
colony.237 Once it became a commonwealth in 1953, and the 
United Nations removed it from the list of non-self-governing 
territories, however, Puerto Rico’s status as a colony, at least with 
the respect to the international community, changed.238  
Does Puerto Rico now qualify as a case of internal self-
determination? On the one hand, Puerto Rico enjoys a certain 
degree of autonomy and international recognition as a 
 
233. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (describing the status options that 
General Assembly Resolution 1541 recognizes). 
234. See generally supra notes 83–110 (providing an overview of Puerto Rico’s 
commonwealth status and the United Nations’ removal of Puerto Rico from the list of 
non-self-governing territories). 
235. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing the status options that 
General Assembly Resolution 2625 recognizes). 
236. See supra notes 75–81 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction 
between internal and external self-determination). 
237. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text (discussing Puerto Rico’s road to 
self-government prior to Public Law 600). 
238. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text (describing the compact theory 
view of Puerto Rico’s political status). 
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commonwealth,239 which suggests that it qualifies more as a case 
of internal self-determination. Moreover, there is very little 
support for independence in Puerto Rico.240 On the other hand, 
the territorial incorporation doctrine still defines the 
relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States,241 and 
Public Law 600 did not offer the people of Puerto Rico the 
option of independence.242 These facts suggest that Puerto Rico 
is still a U.S. colony, and therefore qualifies more as a case of 
external self-determination.243  
A more substantive issue regarding Puerto Rico’s political 
status is that it perpetuates the second-class treatment of the 
people of Puerto Rico. As previously noted, the territorial 
incorporation doctrine still defines the relationship between the 
United States and Puerto Rico.244 Because of this doctrine, the 
people of Puerto Rico do not receive equal treatment under the 
Constitution,245 and have limited political and social rights as 
statutory U.S. citizens.246 While it is true that the people of Puerto 
Rico do not pay federal income taxes, they do pay other taxes247 
and have fought to defend the United States in large numbers, as 
evidenced by their military service.248 In short, Puerto Rico’s 
 
239. See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text (noting that Puerto Rico can 
participate under its own flag in the Olympics and Miss Universe contest). 
240. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (noting that very little support for 
the PIP exists in Puerto Rico); see also supra notes 162, 168 (noting that the 
independence option received just 4.4% of the votes in the 1993 plebiscite in Puerto 
Rico and just 4% in the 1998 plebiscite). 
241. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (explaining that as a constitutional 
matter, Congress maintains plenary power over Puerto Rico); see also supra Part I.B.3 
(providing an overview of the unequal treatment that the people of Puerto Rico receive 
under the U.S. Constitution based on the territorial incorporation doctrine). 
242. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (noting Guevara’s position 
regarding General Assembly Resolution 748 and Puerto Rico’s removal from the list of 
non-self-governing territories). 
243. See supra notes 73–79 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction 
between internal and external self-determination). 
244. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship 
between Puerto Rico and the United States). 
245. See generally Part I.B.3 (providing an overview of the unequal treatment of the 
people of Puerto Rico under Puerto Rico’s commonwealth status). 
246. See id. 
247. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (explaining that the people of 
Puerto Rico pay local and social security taxes even though they do not pay federal 
income taxes). 
248. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (noting that the people of Puerto 
Rico serve in the U.S. Armed Forces in large numbers). 
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political status unjustly disadvantages the people of Puerto Rico, 
who deserve to be treated as equal U.S. citizens. 
Moreover, the people of Puerto Rico are not satisfied with 
the island’s political status. Since the island became a 
commonwealth in 1952, the people of Puerto Rico have asserted 
several legal challenges to their unequal treatment as U.S. 
citizens.249 In addition, they have organized three plebiscites and 
one referendum in an attempt to redefine Puerto Rico’s 
relationship with the United States.250 These attempts have all 
failed, due in part to partisan politics in Puerto Rico,251 but also 
because of Congress’s inability or unwillingness to move forward 
the process of self-determination in Puerto Rico.252 
B. How Puerto Rico’s Political Status Should be Resolved 
As Part II.B of this Note described, there are three key issues 
to resolving Puerto Rico’s political status: (1) whether Congress 
or the people of Puerto Rico should initiate the process of self-
determination in Puerto Rico; (2) which status options should be 
presented to the people of Puerto Rico; and (3) whether 
mainland Puerto Ricans on the island’s future political status. 
Part III.B argues that Congress should initiate the process of self-
determination in Puerto Rico by passing legislation authorizing a 
federally-sanctioned plebiscite for Puerto Rico. Part III.B also 
argues that the people of Puerto Rico should only be presented 
with the status options of U.S. statehood and independence 
because it is in their interests to put a definitive end to Puerto 
Rico’s colonial relationship with the United States. Finally, Part 
III.B maintains that only the people of Puerto Rico should be 
permitted to vote on Puerto Rico’s future political status. 
 
249. See supra notes 125–27 and accompanying text (discussing the Harris and 
Igartúa-De La Rosa decisions). 
250. See supra notes 148–73 and accompanying text (discussing the 1967, 1993, and 
1998 plebiscites held in Puerto Rico and the 1991 referendum). 
251. See generally supra Part II.A (providing an overview of the political status debate 
in Puerto Rico). 
252. See supra notes 159, 169 and accompanying text (noting that Congress failed 
to pass legislation regarding Puerto Rico’s political status prior to the 1993 and 1998 
plebiscites). 
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1. Congress Should Take the First Step 
Congress should take the first step in initiating the process 
of self-determination in Puerto Rico because Congress continues 
to maintain plenary power over the island.253 Critics of the notion 
that Congress should bear the initial responsibility in resolving 
Puerto Rico’s political status will likely assert two arguments. 
First, they will likely contend that the people of Puerto Rico 
should initiate the process of self-determination because they are 
the ones who hold this right. Second, critics will probably 
contend that Congress should not initiate the process of self-
determination until the people of Puerto Rico know what they 
want.254 
The first argument assumes that congressional action in 
initiating a process for resolving the island’s status undermines 
the people of Puerto Rico’s right to self-determination. 
International law, however, does not require that the people of 
Puerto Rico initiate the process of self-determination in Puerto 
Rico. As explained in Part I, supra, self-determination is an 
ambiguous principle in international law with very few clear 
rules.255 All it requires is that the people of Puerto Rico have a 
fair and just opportunity to vote on the future status of the 
island.256 Both the federally-sanctioned plebiscite proposed in the 
Democracy Act and the constitutional convention proposed in 
the Self-Determination Act satisfy this requirement.257 Moreover, 
Congress has a normative obligation to facilitate the process of 
self-determination in Puerto Rico as a signatory to legal 
instruments, such as the ICCPR.258 
The second argument, that Congress should wait until the 
people of Puerto Rico know what they want before initiating the 
 
253. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (describing the view of territorial 
supremacy theorists who contend that Congress did not give up its plenary power over 
Puerto Rico when passing Public Law 600). 
254. See supra notes 159–62, 169–73 and accompanying text (providing an overview 
of the inconclusive 1993 and 1998 plebiscites). 
255. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (noting the imprecise nature of the 
principle of self-determination). 
256. See, e.g., supra note 57 and accompanying text (referring to the use of 
principle of self-determination in article 1 of the ICCPR and the ICESCR). 
257. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the issue of whether Congress of the people of 
Puerto Rico should initiate the process of self-determination in Puerto Rico). 
258. But see supra note 61 and accompanying text (noting that the United States 
has attached several reservations, declarations, and understandings to the ICCPR). 
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process of self-determination, fails to take into account the 
colonial relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico. 
Although the people of Puerto Rico should bear some 
responsibility for their inability to take a definitive position on 
Puerto Rico’s political status, it is important to keep in mind how 
strongly the people of Puerto Rico value their relationship with 
the United States.259 After all, Puerto Rico has been an 
unincorporated U.S. territory since 1898,260 and the people of 
Puerto Rico have been statutory U.S. citizens since 1917.261 For 
this reason, it is easy to see why they have had a difficult time 
deciding on the island’s future political status. 
In moving forward, Congress should stop dragging its feet 
and pass legislation on Puerto Rico’s political status.262 
Congressional legislation is critical to resolving the status of 
Puerto Rico because it would demonstrate recognition by the 
United States of its obligation and commitment to enabling the 
people of Puerto Rico to exercise their right of self-
determination. Granted, the island’s political status is a 
complicated matter that raises questions that many would prefer 
to avoid. Ignoring the issue, however, as President Obama 
suggests, will not make it go away.263 If anything, the passing of 
time will further complicate efforts to resolve Puerto Rico’s 
political status. 
The President’s Task Force should also take a more 
proactive role in facilitating the process of self-determination in 
Puerto Rico. Since proposing a federally-sanctioned plebiscite for 
Puerto Rico in its 2005 report and expanding on it in its 2007 
report, the Task Force has done little to help resolve the island’s 
 
259. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (noting the “profound tension” 
within Puerto Ricans’ souls and questioning how “Puerto Ricans, on the one hand, 
celebrate their national cultural difference and, on the other hand, want even closer ties 
with the United States”). 
260. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing the Treaty of Peace 
following the Spanish-American war). 
261. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the Jones Act, which 
granted the people of Puerto Rico statutory U.S. citizenship). 
262. See, e.g., supra notes 199–202 and accompanying text (stressing the need for 
Congress to pass legislation regarding Puerto Rico’s political status). 
263. See supra note 26 (quoting President Obama’s commitment to resolve Puerto 
Rico’s status). 
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status.264 With the Task Force’s next report due by the end of this 
year265 and President Obama’s pledge to facilitate the resolution 
of Puerto Rico’s status,266 perhaps the people of Puerto Rico will 
have an opportunity to participate in a binding plebiscite that 
will bring an end to the status quo in the near future. 
2. Statehood and Independence Should be the Only Options 
The people of Puerto Rico should not be presented with a 
“new or modified commonwealth” as a status option. First, this 
status option is not realistic. As the President’s Task Force has 
made clear, statehood and independence are the only 
constitutionally viable status options for the people of Puerto 
Rico aside from the island’s current status.267 Moreover, Congress 
does not appear willing to amend the U.S. Constitution to allow 
for the possibility of a “new or modified commonwealth” for 
Puerto Rico.268 Finally, presenting the status option of a “new or 
modified commonwealth” would allow the people of Puerto Rico 
to continue avoiding the hard choice between U.S. statehood 
and independence.269 For all these reasons, the “new or modified 
commonwealth” status option should be eliminated. 
Opponents suggest that elimination of this status option 
would not result in a proper exercise of self-determination.270 
This argument has some appeal. After all, forcing the people of 
Puerto Rico to choose between statehood and independence 
puts pro-commonwealth supporters who seek change in a 
difficult position.271 The principle of self-determination, however, 
does not require that a “new or modified commonwealth” status 
 
264. See supra notes 185–86 and accompanying text (noting the two-step process 
that Task Force introduced in its 2005 first report on Puerto Rico’s political status). 
265. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (referring to Executive Order 
13,517). 
266. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (noting President Obama’s pledge to 
facilitate the process of self-determination in Puerto Rico). 
267. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (observing that there are only two 
non-territorial options that are viable under the U.S. Constitution). 
268. See, e.g., supra note 188 (listing prior versions of the Self-Determination Act 
that have died in Congress). 
269. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (describing an argument against 
including the “new or modified” status option). 
270. See supra notes 215–17 and accompanying text (discussing pro-commonwealth 
arguments against the Democracy Act proposal). 
271. See supra notes 215–17 and accompanying text (discussing pro-commonwealth 
arguments against the Democracy Act proposal). 
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be presented to the people of Puerto Rico.272 Moreover, the three 
modes of self-government that Resolution 1514 recognizes 
suggest a preference in international law for clear status options 
to be presented to the people of Puerto Rico.273 More 
importantly, the time for change in Puerto Rico has come, and 
eliminating the “new or modified commonwealth” status option 
would represent a positive step toward achieving this goal. 
3. Mainland Puerto Ricans Should Not Be Permitted to Vote 
Only the people of Puerto Rico should be permitted to vote 
in a future status plebiscite. As a normative matter, Puerto Rico’s 
political status does not directly affect mainland Puerto Ricans, 
who receive equal treatment under the U.S. Constitution as U.S. 
citizens.274 In other words, unlike the people of Puerto Rico, 
mainland Puerto Ricans would not have to live with an outcome 
that they disagree with on a daily basis. Moreover, as a practical 
matter, permitting mainland Puerto Ricans to vote in a status 
plebiscite would complicate the process of self-determination in 
Puerto Rico. Inadequate resources will likely be an issue just as it 
was in the 1993 parallel plebiscite held in New York City.275 
Accordingly, limiting voting to the people of Puerto Rico makes 
the most sense. 
Still, there appears to be little disagreement on the question 
of whether some mainland Puerto Ricans should have the right 
to vote in a status plebiscite.276 As previously noted, the 
Democracy Act would have allowed mainland Puerto Ricans born 
in Puerto Rico to vote on the island’s political future, and the 
 
272. See generally supra Part I.A (providing an overview of the principle of self-
determination and its use in international instruments). 
273. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (providing an overview of General 
Assembly Resolution 1541, which recognizes independence, free association, and 
integration as providing for a full measure of self-government). But see supra note 71 and 
accompanying text (providing an overview of General Assembly Resolution 2625, which 
also recognizes “the emergence into any other political status freely determined by the 
people” as providing for a full measure of self-government). 
274. See supra note 227 and accompanying text (noting that a change in the Puerto 
Rico’s political status would not directly affect Puerto Ricans residing in the United 
States). 
275. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (stating that only seventy voting 
machines were available in the 1993 parallel plebiscite held in New York). 
276. See generally supra Part II.B.3 (comparing the competing views on whether 
mainland Puerto Ricans should be permitted to vote in a status plebiscite). 
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Self-Determination Act would have expanded this group to 
mainland Puerto Ricans with at least one parent born in Puerto 
Rico.277 Excluding all mainland Puerto Ricans from voting in a 
status plebiscite, therefore, does not appear to be a viable option. 
Because the mainland Puerto Rican population now exceeds 
the island population, the potential number of mainland voters 
may be very large.278 It is important, therefore, to limit the 
number of eligible mainland voters. Limiting eligible mainland 
voters to those born in Puerto Rico is preferable to permitting 
Puerto Ricans with at least one parent who was born the island to 
vote in a status option. The group of eligible mainland voters 
could be further reduced to those who have lived in the United 
States for a certain number of years. Although arbitrary, such 
line-drawing may be necessary to ensure that the people of 
Puerto Rico get the primary say in deciding how Puerto Rico’s 
political status should be resolved. 
CONCLUSION 
For too long, the people of Puerto Rico have been treated as 
second-class U.S. citizens. Because of its ambiguous 
commonwealth status, Puerto Rico has remained an 
unincorporated territory “belonging to[,] but not part of”279 the 
United States. Contrary to the beliefs of some, Puerto Rico’s 
commonwealth status cannot afford the people of Puerto Rico 
the “best of both worlds.” The disproportionally low level of 
federal aid that Puerto Rico receives is egregious. Moreover, the 
staggering poverty rate in Puerto Rico compared to U.S. states 
goes largely unnoticed. In short, Puerto Rico’s commonwealth 
status is unsatisfactory, and the people of Puerto Rico should be 
given an opportunity to exercise their right of self-determination 
in a way that will definitively resolve the status of Puerto Rico. 
Although resolving the status of Puerto Rico will be difficult, 
ignoring the issue will not make it go away. Accordingly, the U.S. 
Congress should stop dragging its feet and pass legislation 
authorizing a binding plebiscite on Puerto Rico. Likewise, the 
 
277. See supra notes 218–19 and accompanying text (describing the provisions of 
the Democracy Act and the Self-Determination Act on eligible voters). 
278. See supra note 220 and accompanying text (noting that the stateside Puerto 
Rican population exceeds that of the island). 
279. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901). 
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President’s Task Force should take a more active role in 
promoting self-determination in Puerto Rico. In terms of the 
international community, the U.N. Decolonization Committee 
should put more pressure on the United States to facilitate the 
process of self-determination in Puerto Rico. Finally, the people 
of Puerto Rico themselves should do a better job of making their 
dissatisfaction with the status quo known. 
Sadly, whether meaningful progress toward resolving Puerto 
Rico’s status in the near future remains to be seen. In the 
meantime, the territorial incorporation doctrine continues to 
disenfranchise nearly four million citizens with little or no legal 
remedy or political recourse. The people of Puerto Rico deserve 
better than the ambiguity that the commonwealth status has 
offered them for the past sixty-odd years. The time has come for 
the people of Puerto Rico to fully exercise their right of self-
determination and end their colonial ties with the United States. 
